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ABSTRACT
DREAMING:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE GRAMMAR OF TRADITIONAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS-ASSOCIATED WITH DREAMING
. ' By .
Kevin Worr B itt le
The purpose of this thesis.is to investigate the grammar of a
traditional and contemporary philosophical problem associated with
dreaming. I t  is the sceptic's contention that the question "Am I awakev
for asleep and dreaming?" is a legitimate question; that although we.
may think we are awake there is always the possibility that we are
asleep and dreaming. I argue that from a Wittgensteinian perspective
the.sceptic's question does not have a use in ordinary language, that 
/  ' ‘
/  its  use is restricted to a special language-game, that of philosophy.
I go on to argue that the sceptic's use of the word "dream" in his 
question is both i l leg itim ate  and unjustified; with the result that 
because the question fa i ls  to express a meaningful possibility i t  should 
no longer be a concern for philosophy.
Norman Malcolm, .in his book Dreaminq (1959) attempts to meet; 
the sceptical question with an argument that sleep has no experiential 
content. But in doing so he raises another question; whether or not 
dreaming can be said to be some kind of mental phenomenon occurring 
during sleep. I t  is Malcolm's contention that dreams are' not composed 
of, or identical with, thoughts, images, sensations or conscious
v
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
experiences' o f any kind. I atsgue tha t from a W ittgensteinian perspec-
\
t iv e  Malcolm's, treatment o f mental events during s)eep is  fa r  too 
re s tr ic t iv e ;  t h a t . i t  goes A ga inst our a ttitu d e  about dreaming, our 
descriptions o f dreams and recent and continuing advances in  science 
and psychology. • The re su lt being tha t both h is position and so lu tion  
to  the sceptical problem are untenable.
The method o f appraisal is  composed o f four steps. F irs t ,
?
Descartes' Meditations and contemporary sceptical positions are elucidated
in  an e f fo r t  to'determ ine the o r ig in  and nature o f the scep tic 's  question.
The pos ition , and re fu ta tion  o f the scep tic 's  pos ition  advanced by
Malcolm are subsequently examined. Both positions (th^-ecepti c 's  and
Malcolm's) are then c r it ic iz e d  using some o f the methods and remarks
suggested by Ludwig W ittgenstein as the basis o f analysis. With each
' *
position the conclusions reached as a re s u lt o f th is  c r it iq u e  are re­
viewed in  an attempt to explain the confusions and d i f f ic u lt ie s  tha t 
fo llow  from subscribing to  e ith e r o f the two positions.
' c .
I argue, in  conclusion, tha t in  l ig h t  o f continuing d i f f ic u l t ie s  * 
to  make sense o f and formulate conclusive arguments against both the 
sceptic and Malcolm* a grammatical inves tiga tion  provides the most 
p lausib le a lte rna tive  as a way o f tack ling  these questions tha t 
philosophy can pursue.
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INTRODUCTION
r
When I consider these matters care fu lly ,I  realize  
so clearly that there are no conclusive indications 
by. which waking l i f e  can be distinguished "'from sleep 
i that I .am quite astonished,and my bewilderment is
such that i t  is almost able to convince me that I am 
■ sleeping.
' • 1Descartes, Meditations
** *  \  “ ■ ■ ’
 ^ *
I t  is unusual to open a standard textbook of philosophy, psychology
or religion and not find at least one reference -to dreaming. ^Dreams
o.
have enjoyed great popularity because of the ir extraordinary nature. In
days of old, people regarded dreams as favourable or hostile .manifesta- .
tions of higher powers, demonic and divine. Dreams have been associated
with wishes, desires and have often been linked up to the creative pro-
’
cess. Dreams continue to be a source of interest to scholars in.various
disciplines today.
In his paper, "The Problem of Dreams," Roger Squires states:
" I t  is almost universally believed that dreams ocdur during sleep and
2 'that people are capable of recalling them when they wake up." Dreams 
and dreaming are not unusual occurrences. Although dreams can be 
abnormal, even bizarre, they are not unusual in the sense that they 
happen to only one or two of us. Very few people can say that they 
have never had a dream. The fact that a dream is a common occurrence 
■ of unusual character is s ignificant. I t  is perhaps the single most 
important reason for the controversy surrounding dreams throughout the 
history.of philosophy thus far.
1
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2Dreaming has long been associated with the problem of scepticism.
In the Dialogue Theaetetus, Socrates asks, "What evidence could be
appealed to, supposing we were asked at this very moment whether we are
asleep or awake?" Theaetetus replies,: "Indeed Socrates, I do not see
✓
by whal; evidence i t  is to be proved, for the two conditions correspond •
3 'in every circumstance l ike  exact counterparts." Although the sceptical
problem is mentioned in the writings of ancient philosophers, the French 
philosopher Rene Descartes is credited with being the f i r s t  to enunciate 
i t  clearly.
The sceptic's situation'with respect to dreams as presented in 
the Meditations boils down to a question stated something l ike  this:
"Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" This question has been the central 
and most substantial problem tied up with philosophical discussions of 
dreaming. While some contemporary sceptics maintain there is no way to 
know that you are awake, other philosophers' claim to have shown that the 
sceptical problem associated with dreams is not a problem at a l l .
Norman Malcolm is one such philosopher. He says: "There.are not two
p-
things for me to decide between, one that I am awake the other that I 
am not awake. There is nothing to decide, no choice to make, nothing 
to find out."^ •
Philosophers from Aristotle to Russell have held that dreams 
are mental states present during sleep. Malcolm's book, Dreaming has 
received as much careful consideration as the sceptical problem assocated 
with dreams because i t  sets out to refute this, Though his position is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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/
formulated in an e ffo r t  to silence the sceptic, I believe i t  fathers ***
more problems than i t  clears away. In the Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein states: -  /
5
Essence is expressed by grammar.
One cannot guess how a word.functions. One has 
to look at i ts  use and learn from th a t .6
M a ll  i<ieve we should keep these two statements^n mind when we try to
resolve the philosophical problems associated with dreaming.
This thesis w il l  attempt to confront a traditional and contem-
'  I
porary philosophical problem' by investigating the grammar of twcy ques- . 
tions: 1) "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming'?", 2) "Are dreams com­
posed of or identical with thoughts, images, mental phenomena occurring 
during sleep?" By way of introduction T w ill  outline two positions on 
dreams (Descartes and Malcolm). Using various statements and insights 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein as a basis of analysis, I w il l  then carry out a 
grammatical investigation of the many and varied uses of the word "dream." .
Following that, I w ill  return to the sceptic and Malcolm and examine the 
d if f ic u lt ies  involved in the ir positions in l ig h t  of this grammatical 
investigation. We.will see that both questions play a central role' in 
the sceptic's and Malcolm's position on dreams.
Since this thesis is principally a grammatical investigation,✓
I w ill  not be proposing an empirical explanation of dreams. I f  any 
. t
avenue is open for us, i t  w ill  be that this investigation' of the grammar 
of the word "dream" may provide us with philosophic insight into two
i
questions associated with dreaming that have plagued the history of (
philosophy so far. i
- T  '  1
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FOOTNOTES
Introduction
i *
Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations[M], 
trans. Laurence J. LaFleur (New York: Bobbs-Merri11 Company, I960),
P- 77‘ ‘
^Roger Squires, "The Problem o f  Dreams," Philosophy 48 
(December 1973): 247.,
Plato, The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 863.
4Norman Malcolm, Dreaming [D j, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1959), p. 118.
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [P I ] , trans. 
G.E.M. Anscomt  ^ (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc .,  1968), .
#371.
6Ib id . ,  #340.
r
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CHAPTER I
E SCEPTICAL PROBLEM IN DESCARTES' MEDITATIONS
question "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?"Vhas been, a 
source of controversy among philosophers for a number of centuries. 
Scholars have-continued to wrestle with this problem since the publica­
tion of the Meditations in 1641. Every'effort has been made to resolve 
this problem, to provide a proof or test that would establish, with 
certainty, that one is awake and not being deceived in a dream. A con­
clusive test or proof is s t i l l  lacking.
What is Descartes' position with respect to dreams? In order 
to answer this question, i t  is necessary to examine the Meditations 
closely.' In this chapter, I w ill  br ie f ly  outlihe the sceptical problem 
associated with dreams as i t  appears in the First Meditation. I w ill  
then touch on the principle of coherence that Descartes presents .in 
the Sixth Meditation. Finally, I w i l l  explain what is involved in 
holding a firm sceptical attitude with respect to dreams. This discus­
sion w ill  set the stage for the presentation of Norman Malcolm's account 
of dreams, which w ill  appear in the following chapter.
In the Preface to the Meditations Descartes is intent on persuad­
ing us to free ourselves from a dependence on our senses. He says:
I undertake directly to treat of God and of the human 
mind, and at the same time, to lay the foundations of 
f i r s t  philosophy. I do this without expecting any 
praise for i t  from the vulgar, and without hoping 
that my book w ill  be read by many. On the contrary,
I would not recommend i t  to any except to those who
5
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6would want to meditate seriously along w ith me, and 
' who are capable o f freeing the mind from attachment 
to the senses and clearing i t  e n t ire ly ^ f f  a l l  sorts 
o f prejudices. [M, p. 69.]
According to Descartes, in order to develop the foundations o f philosophy
one must begin by a rr iv in g  a t fundamental c e rta in tie s --c le a r and d is t in c t,
ideas. I t  is  his opinion tha t the senses stand in  the way o f ’ c lear and
d is t in c t ideas because they sometimes deceive us:
Everything which I have thus fa r  accepted as e n tire ly  
true and assured has been acquired from the senses or • 
by means o f the senses. But I have learned by experience 
tha t these senses sometimes mislead men, and i t  is  
prudent never to tru s t wholly those things which have -
once deceived us. [M, p. 76.]
Descartes1 pro ject in the Meditations is  one o f attempting to
"get behind the ordinary world and ordinary language to a more funda-
2mental ce rta in ty  from which philosophizing could begin." He considers
the phenomenon o f dreaming because, fo r Descartes * a dream is  an il lu s io n
and a remarkable example o f how the senses can sometimes deceive us:
But I am speaking as-though I never reca ll having been 
misled, while asleep, by s im ila r il lu s io n s ! When; .I 
consider these matters c a re fu lly , I rea lize  so c lea rly  
that there are no conclusive ind ica tions by which waking 
l i f e  can be distinguished from sleep tha t I am quite 
astonished, and my bewilderment is  such tha t i t  is  
almost able to convince me th a t I am sleeping. [M, p. 77.]
I t ' i s  a t th is  po in t tha t the sceptical problem, tha t o f d is tingu ish ing
waking l i f e  from sleep, receives i t s  f i r s t  c lear and serious enunciation. 
* *
The sceptical problem associated w ith dreaming can be stated in
the fo llow ing way. At th is  very moment I am W riting th is  thesis. But
I might have a dream in  which I am here, seated a t th is  desk w rit in g
th is  paper. And i f  I am dreaming, I would not be seated at th is  desk
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
V
writing this paper, I would be lying undressed, asleep in my bed. Now 
i t  seems clear to me that I am awake and that, i t  is with some design 
and deliberate intent that jl write these words with this pen''and per­
ceive the result. But since the experience of writing this thesis in 
my dream is similar to what I am feeling right now, I have no way of 
te ll ing  at this very moment whether I am awake or asleep.
Descartes1 project—that of trying to establish a test whereby
one could know with certainty that he is awake—exposed the d iff ic u lty  ■
that has kept the sceptical problem associated with dreaming alive for
a number of centuries. I f  I could'show that certain things only occur
when I am awake, I could solve the Cartesian dream problem. M.J. Baker,
in his paper, "Sleeping and Waking," puts this quite well when he says:
When Descartes says that no certain marks ever 
distinguish waking from sleep, he implies that no 
such marks are apprehended either in i t i a l l y  .or 
subsequently. I f  we show that they occur in i t i a l l y  
then he is refuted, and i t  would be unnecessary and 
redundant to show also that they occur subsequently.3
However, we must be careful here.. As we read through the First Meditation,
i t  is as i f  Descartes has come to a standstill with respect to the
r
question "How can I t e l l  whether I am awake or asleep?" But in the 
Sixth Meditation Descartes offers absolution to the sceptical problem.
i
Descartes did not continue to hold that there were no conclusive 
indications by which waking l i f e  could be distinguished from sleep. He 
declares' that the philosophical doubt associated with dreams is "hyper­
bolical and ridiculous." [M, p. 143.] In. the Sixth Meditation he claims 
that i t  is theoretically possible for anyone to determine whether he is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner Further reproduction prohibited without permissioh.
awake or asleep using a principle of coherence:^
And I should reject a ll  the doubts of these last
few days as exaggerated and ridiculous, particularly
that very general uncertainty about sleep, which I 
could not distinguish from waking l i f e .  For now I 
find a very notable difference between the two, in 
that our memorj' can never bind and join our dreams 
together one with another and a ll  with the course 
of our lives, as i t  habitually joins together what 
happens to us when we are awake. (M, p. 143.] ^
The principle of coherence is cited by Descartes to establish that
there are no reasons for doubting whether he is awake or asleep. I am
awake i f  the events that are happening to me cohere and can be united
with one another through n\y memory in a consistent whole. According to
the principle of coherence, i f  I cannot connect the perceptions I am
having with the whole course of rr\y l i f e ,  I must be asleep and dreaming.
A number of contemporary philosophers have put forward novel 
tests and proofs that they believe establish with certainty, that one 
is awake:
Patently, I can dream that I am behaving in pain, 
for example that I am writhing or calling out in 
pain. When, however, I try to conceive the dreaming 
of a pain I find that I.cannot. I find that I have 
conceived, not the dreaming of a pain, but simply
the experiencing of a pain. But that is not dream­
ing a pain: that is being in pain. Hence, I can
meet the Cartesian dream argument in the folTowing 
way. Whenever i t  gives rise in my mind to the 
question "Can I now te l l  whether I am dreaming or 
waking?" I need merely pinch myself. I f  I have a 
feeling of pain, I cannot be dreaming that I do.
Thus, I now pinch myself and I now feel pain.
I conclude with certainty that I am not dreaming.
But i f  I am not dreaming, and i f  I am conscious 
(which I am), i t  follows that I am awake. 5
Leon Pearl, in his paper "Is Theaetetus Dreaming?" gives us this argument
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Most of a man's memories and beliefs which are  ^
thought operative while awake are stored away when
dreaming. Waking up consists of 41) becoming aware .
o.f your surroundings, (2) your beliefs and memories 
becoming thought operative. (2) is a suffic ient 
condition for knowing you are awake.6
On the other hand, a few contemporary sceptics (Peter Unger,
Fritz  Mauthner) s t i l l  maintain that there is no way to resolve the 
sceptical problem associated with dreams. Regardless of the tests or 
proofs formulated to establish that one is awake, the contemporary 
sceptic w ill  declare them all to be unsuccessful. He w il l  reply that
"there is no such description to be had. I t  is just as meaningful to
say 'I dreamt I pinched myself' or ‘ I dreamt my experiences cohere1 as 
i t  is to say 'I pinched myself'-jMly experiences cohere.'"^ The contem­
porary sceptic holds that you cannot know, but only believe* that you 
are awake. And since he refuses to credit any tests or proof that 
would establish that you are awake, i t  is always possible that you are 
asleep and that everything is a dream.
Perhaps the greatest d if f ic u lty  with Descartes' appeal to the
principle of coherence is the fact that he f e l t  i t  offered a conclusive
test that could establish with certainty that one is awake. Although
other philosophers since Descartes have subscribed to the principle of
coherence, they believe i t  to establish that one is awake with probability,
rather than certainty. Witness this quote from A.J. Ayer:
I may find among my sense-data the relations that 
ju s t ify  me in grouping them to form material things;
I may apply the authorized methods for assigning to 
■these things their "real characteristics"; I may even 
have such experiences as I should ordinarily describe 
by saying that I was making use of the c r ite r ia  of
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measurement; and s t i l l  I may wake to find that I
have been dreaming a ll  a lo ng .. .8 * ' /
However, contemporary sceptics continue to maintain that you cannot 
know, but only believe that you are awake. Therefore, any kind of sub­
scription to a principle of coherence is fru it less . Neither probability  
nor certainty plays a part since i t  is always poss.ible that I am rrot 
awake and making connections through my memory, I am only dreaming that 
I am. .
This sceptical position is similar to ah objection raised
against the coherence principle by Norman Malcolm in Dreaming:
The objection that should occur to anyone is  that i t  is 
possible a person should dream that the right connections 
./ hold, dream that he connects his present perceptions with
\ .  'the whole course of his l i f e ' .  The coherence principle
\  te lls  us that we are awake i f  we can make these connec-
tions and asleep in a dream i f  we cannot: but how does
the principle te l l  us whether we are noting and making 
connections or dreaming that we are? [D, p. 108.]
The fact that a contemporary sceptic can use this objection to preserve 
the sceptical problem speaks against the coherence principle as a 
satisfactory way of resolving the dream enigma. Malcolm, however, argues 
that there is a way to resolve the sceptical problem associated with 
dreaming. The resolution cannot be had by subscribing to a principle 
of coherence^ Rather, Malcolm argues for the thesis that dreams are 
not identical with, or composed of thoughts, images, sensations; con­
scious 'experiences of any kind. On this basis "the general uncertainty," 
* •}
(the question of whether I am awake or asleep and dreaming), which 
Descartes alludes to in the Sixth Meditation loses its  status as a 
' .meaningful philosophical problem:
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There are not two things fo r  me to decide between,
one tha t I am awake the other tha t I am not awake.
There is  nothing to decide, no choice -to make, 
nothing to find  out.' []), p. 118.]
B r ie f ly ,  Malcolm considers the scep tic 's  question '.'Am I awake 
or asleep and dreaming?" senseless in  tha t one o f the a lte rna tives 
implied by i t  expresses a ^p o s s ib ility  tha t one cannot th in k . Whatever 
goes to show tha t someone is  making a judgment while asleep would stand 
as ^ev^lence tha t the person is  awake*. In th is  respect, Descartes'
p ro je c t, tha t o f find-ing a d is tingu ish ing  mark between waking l i f e  and
sleep, loses its  c re d ib i l i ty  as a s ig n if ic a n t philosophical enterprise. 
This is  because a sleeping subject is  not capable o f asking questions, 
..making judgments or wondering about anything at a ll while asleep " fo r  
sleep qua sleep has no experientia l content." [D, p. 39].♦
Malcolm's re fu ta tio n  o f the sceptical problem associated w ith
% .
dreams is  supported by his unusual thesis tha t dreams are not iden tica l 
w ith , or composed of thoughts, images, sensations etc. In order to get 
a foothold w ith Malcolm's re fu ta tion  o f the sceptical problem associated 
w ith  dreaming, one must examine his pos ition  in some d e ta il.  Let us now 
turn to  Malcolm's Dreaming and his paper, "Dreaming and Scepticism" and 
h ig h lig h t the main points o f his position  tha t w i l l  leave us be tte r able 
to judge whether he succeeds in  making a convincing case against the 
sceptical problem associated w ith  dreams.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
FOOTNOTES
Chapter I
Whe reader should note at the outset that the traditional 
sceptical question, "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" is not 
Descartes' question. In the Meditations Descartes is concerned with 
arriving at a mark or indication with-Hrffyich he can distinguish waking 
l i f e  from sleep. Although his discussion of dreams in the First 
Meditation appears to point toward the sceptical question there is no 
textual evidence to support the notion that he asked the question or 
ever considered the question seriously.
2 "Robert Botkin, "Descartes' F irst Meditation: A Point of
Contact for Contemporary Philosophical Methods," Southern Journal of 
Phildsoph.y (Fall 1972): 356.
. 3M.J. Baker, "Sleeping and Waking," Mind (1954): 539.
4
A point about Descartes' methodology should be made here. To 
say that Descartes resolved the sceptical problem associated with : 
dreaming by subscribing to the principle of coherence is not entirely  
correct. The assurance^that he is awake, and not asleep and dreaming 
is primarily supported by his belie f and trust in a veracious God:
And I should not in any way doubt the truth of these 
th ings .if ,  having made use of a ll  my senses, my 
memory, and my understanding, to examine them, nothing 
is reported to me by any of them which is inconsistent 
with what is.reported by the others. For, from the 
fact that God is not a deceiver, i t  necessarily follows 
in this matter I am not deceived. [M_, p. 143.]
Therefore, the valid ity  of the coherence principle (for Descartes) pre­
supposes a divine guarantee.
^John 0. Nelson, "Can One Tell That He is Awake by Pinching Himself?"
Philosophical Studies 17 (1966): 82.
^Leon Pearl, "Is Theaetetus Dreaming?" Philosophy and Pheno­
menological Research 31 (1970-71): 112-113.
7 Ib id . , 110.
O
A.J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc .,  1940), p. 273.
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CHAPTER I I  
MALCOLM ON DREAMS AND DREAMING
Norman Malcolm's Dreaming (1959} and "Dreaming and Scepticism" 
(1957) are important contributions to philosophical l i te ra tu re . These 
two works, taken together, provide the most thoroughgoing and controversial 
treatment of philosophical questions that surround the phenomenon of
I
dreaming. Malcolm argues that the sceptical problem associated with
dreaming is unwarranted:
A consequence of my argument is that there is no 
Q room le f t  for the skeptical question (a) "How can
I know whether 1 am awake or sound asleep?"-- 
for the question is absurd, since i f  I raise i t  
I am not sound asleep. 2
In order to appreciate how this philosopher tackles the sceptical
problem le f t  in the wake of the Meditations^, i t  is necessary to examine 
his position with respect to dreams.
. Malcolm's Dreaming and "Dreaming and Scepticism" have been the 
centre of many a debate. These two works are controversial in that
they present us with a new philosophical position on dreams. Malcolm's
position (that dreams are not composed o f, or identical with any kind .of 
mental phenomenon occurring during sleep), and his opinions about dreams 
and dreaming have been both supported and attacked vigorously in a number 
,  of philosophical journals. Philosophers, psychologists and the common 
man have always believed that dreaming was supposed to be a kind of mental-
13
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phenomenon that occurs during sleep. Malcolm's position with respect
to dreams is both unique and problematic in that i t  sets out to dispute
this: ' >
I f  a philosopher uses the phrase 'mental phenomenon',
Say, in such a way that dreams are mental phenomena 
by defin ition, then obviously no argument is going to 
prove him that they are not. I avoid this way of stating 
the matter. What I say instead is that i f  anyone holds 
that dreams are identical with, or composed of thoughts, 
impressions, feelings, images and so on (here one may 
supply whatever other mental nouns one l ikes , except 
'dreams') , occurring in sleep, then his view is false.
CD, p, 52.]
One of the things a reader w ill  notice is that Malcolm's account
of dreams is very guarded. He w ill  go to grea^lengths to te l l  us what
dreaming is not:
Aristotle says that a dream is a kind of illusory  
sense-presentation occurring in sleep (A ris to tle ,
459a, 460b, 462a). Descartes thought that in dreaming 
we reason and judge in exactly the same sense that we do 
wheg awake. Hobbes believed that dreams are ‘ the 
imaginations of them that sleep' (Hobbes,.Pt. I ,  Ch. 2).
Other philosophers think that dreaming is having images 
or even hallucinations in sleep.
These opinions can be seen to be mistaken... t'he idea that 
someone might reason, judge, imagine, or have impressions, 
presentations,illusions or hallucinations, while asleep, 
is a meaningless idea in the sense that we have no con­
ception of what could establish that these things did 
or did not occur. We know perfectly well,  however, what 
establishes that a person dreamt while he slept—namely, 
his te lling  a dream. This clear difference in possibility  
of verification shows that dreams are none of the things 
that philosophers have commonly supposed them to be.
[]), pp. 49-50.]
But Malcolm refuses to commit himself to te ll in g  us what dreaming is: v,
But I am not trying to maintain that a dream is the 
waking impression that one dreamt. This would be
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self-contradictory. Indeed, I am not trying to say  ^
what dreaming is: I do not understand what i t  would
. ;mean to do that. [D, -p. 59.]
Although Malcolni maintains he Vs not attempting to te l l  us
what dreaming " is ,"  he does offer a few clues. Perhaps the best way 
to understand his account of dreams is to enumerate the clues, and see 
i f  we can arrive at a sharper picture. Malcolm contests the notion _ 
that a dream, is a kind of mental phenomenon that occurs during sleep. 
However, when Malcolm says "Dreams are not composed of, or identical 
with thoughts, images, sensations...," we should not take him to be 
claiming that dreams do not occur. Malcolm is quite committed to the
l
view that people do dream, "I do not understand what-the f i r s t  statement 
('Dreaming is a real experience') could mean other than people really
have the power.to influence the 
way we ta lk  about our sleep. As w ell ,  they have the a b i l i ty  to effect
A person whose state satisfied completely, for several 
hours, the c r ite r ia  of sleep and was, therefore, sound 
asleep during that time, may not have had a sound sleep. 
He may awake feeling quite exhausted and i f  so he w ill  
not say that he had a good or sound sleep.. And i f  he 
had a very unpleasant dream he would not say that he had., 
a sound sleep: whereas he could say this i f  he had a 
pleasant dream. [D, pp. 32-33.].
According to Malcolm then, i f  a person has an enjoyable dream, he w ill
wake up in the morning, feeling refreshed. I f  he has a disturbing dream, 
he w ill  wake up feeling weak and fatigued. Therefore, dreams are 
qualitatively d ifferent. A dream is not just a dream, i t  can be gratifying
the way we feel when we wake up in the morning:.
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as well as unsettling.
In addition to these 'points, Malcolm te lls  us that a dream
4  5
has content, that i t  involves a number of events, and that in a dream
a person can do the’’ impossible in every sense of the word, "That some­
thing is implausible or impossible does not go to show that I did not 
dream i t .  In a dream I can climb Everest without oxygen and I can 
square the c irc le .
In summary, Malcolm affirms that:
(1) dreams do occur;
(2) dreams have qualitative  differences;
r 4
(3) dreams have content;
(4) dreams involve a number of events connected in some
fashion; ^
(5) in a dream, a person'can do the impossible in every 
sense of the word.
But, Malcolm also states that (6) dreams are not identical vyjth or com­
posed of thoughts, impressions, feelings, images, or any kind of mental 
phenomenon occurring during sleep.
In Malcolm making the claim that dreams are not experiences? 
Although there is no textual evidence to support this opinion, the reader 
has an uneasy feeling that this claim is lurking somewhere under the 
surface of his entire book. In Chapter I I I ,  "Judging That One is Asleep," 
Malcolm entertains the notion held by other philosophers (Descartesj Kant, 
Russell, A risto tle  and others) that i t  is possible to make judgments
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durlVig sleep: " I f  a man can make judgments during sleep then i t  ought
1 '
to be possible fo r  him to judge, among other th ings, tha t is  asleep."^ 
Malcolm asks "Could I upon awaking describe my previous condition and
g
inqu ire  whether tha t condition is  ca lled  'being asleep?"1 and
answers: . ' '
This suggestion loses a l l  p la u s ib i l i ty - . i f  we ask what ;
the nature o f th is  descrip tion would be  The
descrip tion  would have to be o f some conscious 
experience. But having some conscious experience or 
o ther, no matter what, is  not what is  meant by being 
' asleep. [£ , p. 12.] .
A
Another quote tha t seems to po in t to  the thesl's tha t dreams are not
experiences appears in  his paper “ Dreaming and Scepticism":
When’ a person is  sound asleep he cannot have any thoughts, 
sensations or fee lings a t a l l ;  sound asleep in  th is  
cannot have any "content o f  experience." This is  so 
regardless o f whether or not the sleeper dreams. [ D & S,
P- 114.]  ' • ,
Malcolm appears to be saying a dream is  something other than an
experience, but i t  i s n ' t  anything th a t happens to us or takes place
9while we are asleep. A consequence o f th is  paradoxical position is  
tha t you walk away w ith  th is  question, "What is  i t  tha t Malcolm takes 
dreaming to be?" '
Why is  i t  tha t Malcolm is  re lu c tan t to give us the essence o f 
dreaming or te-ll us what a dream is? Is i t  perhaps because he holds 
the view th a t we know everything there is  to know about dreams? Notice, 
Malcolm takes the question about “ the real existence o f dreams" i .e .  
-whether dreams'take ptlace in  log ica l independence o f waking impressions, 
«^s a purely metaphysical question, "A question such as 'How do you .know 
th is  happened while you s lep t? ' does not a rise  in  the ordinary commerce
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of l i f e  and language."^ However, this is not the reason why Malcolm 
i's hesitant to give us the essence of dreaming or te l l  us what dreaming 
“is ."  Malcolm maintains that a dream is not identical w ith, or composed 
of any kind of mental phenomenon because i t . i s  theoretica lly  impossible
i ✓
to verify  someone's having mental phenomena during sleep:
I f  i t  is theoretically  impossible to verify  that someone 
had ijnages, say, in his sleep, but possible t o ‘verify  
that^heNireamt, then a dream cannot be identical .with, 
nor composed of, images experienced during sleep. [D, p. 51.]
Malcolm's v e r if ia b ility  argument involves (1) that we establish
a person is making a judgment/while asleep through observation, (2) that
we establish the person knows he .is making a judgment while he is asleep
Malcolm argues that i f  i t  were possible for someone to know that he is
making a judgment while asleep, he would not be asleep. He would be
awake. This is because Malcolm defines sleep in such a way that judgments,
or any other mental a c tiv itie s , are not possible fo r a steeping subject:
In order to know,that when a man said ‘ I am asleep' 
he gave a true description of his own s ta te , one 
would have to know that he said i t  while asleep and 
—  that he was aware of saying i t .  This is  an impossible 
thing to know, because whatever showed that he was 
aware of saying that sentence would also show that 
he was not asleep. [D, p .-10.]
What follows is that a sleeping -subject is incapable o f making 
a judgment while asleep since, “i t  would be self-contradictory to verify  
that a man was both asleep and judging because whatever in his behaviour 
showed he was making the judgment would equally show that he was not , 
asleep ."^  . *»'
Malcolm‘ s v e r if ia b ility  argument with respect to the judgment 
"I am asleep" also applies to the judgment “I  am dreaming" because the
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
sense in which Malcolm considers the word "dream" implies that for
someone to be dreaming he must also be asleep:
I f  ' I  am dreaming1 could express a judgment i t  would 
imply the judgment ' I  am asleep', and therefore the 
absurdity of the la t te r  proves the absurdity of the 
former. [D, p. 109.]
The upshot of Malcolm's argument is that the sceptical problem enunciated
by Descartes in the Meditations and the traditional sceptical question
"Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" can be rejected as nonsense:
There are not two things for me to decide between, one
that I am awake the other that I am not awake. There 
is nothing to decide, no choice to make, nothing to 
find o u t . . . .  Therefore the sentence ' I  don't know 
whether I am awake or dreaming' cannot be a proper 
description of my condition, being i ts e l f  a piece of 
nonsense. [J3, p. 118.]
V e r if ia b ility  allows Malcolm to make quick work of the sceptic.
And i f  we allow him to have his way with the thesis that dreams are not 
composed o f, or identical with any kind of mental phenomenon occurring 
during sleep, i t  seems as i f  Malcolm has provided a plausible refutation
of the sceptical problem associated with dreaming. That is to say, i f
we grant Malcolm the liberty  of maintaining that sleep has no experiential 
content, his claim that a sleeping subject cannot judge, think, have 
impressions etc. is a safe one. S t i l l ,  we wonder i f  Malcolm is  correct 
in claiming that dreams are not composed o f, or identical with any kind 
of mental phenomenon occurring during sleep. The new position on dreams 
that Malcolm has provided in D and D & S seems to go against our opinions 
and attitudes toward the phenomenon of dreaming. Most of us have a 
strong inclination to think that dreaming is  a kind of mental ac tiv ity
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tha t we experience during sleep. We w i l l  explore th is  Tn greater d e ta il 
in  Chapter V.
The arguments fo r  and against Malcolm's thesis have been many
and varied since the pub lica tion  o f £  and D & S. I t  seems tha t in  order
to provide a successful re fu ta tio n  o f the tra d itio n a l sceptical problem ■ v
associated w ith  dreaming Malcolm must commit himself to th e ’pos ition
tha t sleep has no experien tia l content. Yet, to do th is ,  we wonder i f
i t  is  not a heavy price to pay in  l ig h t  o f a l l  the c r it ic is m  tha t con-
12tinues to fo llow  in  i t s  t r a i l .
Our examination o f Malcolm's pos ition  on dreams leaves us w ith 
the fo llow ing 'questions: “ Is Malcolm ju s t i f ie d  in th ink ing  ‘that his
argument can be used to destroy the foundations o f Cartesian scepticism?" 
Moreover, " Is  Malcolm1correct to maintain tha t dreams are not id e n tica l 
w ith , or composed o f any kind o f mental phenomenon occurring during sleep?" 
Before we attempt to answer these $nd other philosophical questions 
associated w ith  the phenomenon o f dreaming, our a tten tion  w i l l  be d irected 
toward a number o f statements and ins igh ts  o f  one other philosopher,
Ludwig W ittgenstein. I believe tha t d i f f ic u l t ie s  which surround the 
sceptical question connected w ith  dreaming, and Malcolm's unusual thes is , 
can be brought to l ig h t  by fo llow ing two remarks a rticu la te d  by W ittgenstein 
in  the Philosophical Investiga tions. They are:
Essence is  expressed by grammar. [P I, #371.]
One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to 
look a t i t s  use and learn from th a t. [E l , #340.]
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To those un fam ilia r w ith W ittgenste in 's philosophy these 
remarks may sound somewhat mysterious in  l ig h t  o f our discussion o f 
dreams and dreaming so fa r . I t  is fo r  th is  reason th a t I now wish to 
turn to W ittgenstein 's l ite ra tu re  and b r ie f ly  illum ina te  a number o f 
his statements and ins igh ts  tha t w i l l  serve as the basis o f analysis 
fo r  the remainder o f th is  thes is .
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FOOTNOTES
C h ap te r I I
^When c it in g  a te x t from Malcolm's Dreaming or "Dreaming and 
Scepticism," in  the remainder o f th is  thes is , I w i l l  use the abbrevi­
ations £  and D & S respective ly.
2
Norman Malcolm, "Dreaming and-Scepticism," Philosophical 
Essays on Dreaming, ed. Dunlop (Ithaca: Cornell U n iversity Press,
1977), p. 124.
3
Norman Malcolm, Dreaming (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1959), p. 58. • ' _
4Ib id . , p. 63.
5Ib id . , p. 85. '
6Ib id . , p. 57.
7Ib id . , p . 9.
8Ib id . , p. 12.
Q
H.D. Lewis, Dreaming and Experience (L.T. Hobhouse Lecture, 
University o f London: Athlone P r e s s 1968), pp. 6-7.
^Malcolm, Dreaming, p. 84.
n ib id . ,  p. 36.
12The c ritic ism s  offered against Malcolm's pos ition  have been 
many and varied since the pub lica tion  o f D & S and D_. In order to 
appreciate the objections and controversy which surround Malcolm's 
position the reader should examine the fo llow ing papers which I have 
found most illum ina tin g  in  th is  respect:
A.J. Ayer, "Professpr Malcolm on Dreams"; Robert L. Caldwell, 
"Malcolm and the C rite rion  o f Sleep", contained along w ith  others in 
Charles Dunlop's Philosophical Essays on Dreaming ed. Dunlop (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1977).
However, in  tha t my c r it iq u e  o f Malcolm concerns the grammar 
o f the philosophical problem le f t  unanswered by h is treatment o f dream­
ing I have decided not to e lucidate these c ritic ism s  .in  any d e ta il.
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eCHAPTER I I I
SOME WITTGENSTEINIAN INSIGHTS AND CONSIDERATIONS
In the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Vol. I)
Wittgenstein says:
Of course I don't want >to give a defin ition of 
the word "dream"; but s t i l l  I want to do some- , 
thing like  i t :  to describe the use of the word.
There are d iff ic u ltie s  involved in presenting a chapter intended to
summarize Wittgenstein's position on dreams. Although he brought
l ' forward some interesting ideas on dreams, he did not give dreaming an
extensive philosophical treatment. As w ell, anyone fam ilia r with
Wittgenstein's writings w ill be aware of his a b ility  to condense
extremely d if f ic u lt  thoughts into concise and subtle statements. His
penchant for compression of d if f ic u lt  ideas, coupled with the sparse
amount of material available on dreams, makes any interpretation of
his philosophy susceptible to misinterpretation and misunderstanding.
In this respect a w riter attempting to approach the topic of dreams
in Wittgenstein, or prepare a chapter intended to summarize his
philosophy, should be prepared for hard work and possible disappointment.
With these considerations in mind, I am reluctant to o ffer a 
•compendium of Wittgenstein's philosophy or explain his position on 
dreams. I w ill re s tric t this chapter to only those remarks and in­
sights that serve as the basis of analysis for the remainder of this  
thesis. I w ill present a b rie f outline of Wittgenstein's notion of
. 2 3
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"grammar" and " c r i te r ia , "  concluding the chapter w ith  a few words
about what is  involved in  a gra t i£ a l inves tiga tio n .
W ittgenste in 's Notion o f "Grammar"
When W ittgenstein refers to "grammar," he does so in  a number
*
o f ways. Here are a few examples:
Essence is  expressed by grammar. [PI_, #371.]
Grammar does not te l l  us how language must be con- 
tructed in  order to f u l f i l  i t s  purpose, in  order to 
have such-and-such an e ffe c t on human beings. I t  
only describes and in  no way explains the use o f 
signs. [PI_, #496.]
So is  th a t what makes us believe a proposition?
Well — the grammar o f "be lieve" ju s t does hang 
together w ith the grammar o f the proposition 
believed. [OC, #313.] 2
"You ca n 't hear God speak to someone else, you 
can hear him only i f  you.are being addressed."—
That is  a grammatical remark. [Z , #717 .]3
Whenever I th ink o f grammar, I have a system o f rules fo r speak­
ing and w rit in g  a language in mind. W ittgenste in 's references to grammar 
leave a great deal to the imagination. A recently published a r t ic le ,  
e n tit le d  "Grammar" has th is  to say:
Grammar describes conventions and customs, but they 
are not to be seen as mere a rb itra ry  conventions.
I t  exh ib its  the games we play, the s k i l ls  and 
techniques we have acquired as part o f a form o f 
l i f e .  4
Grammar helps us see the uses we make o f language
as games o f so rts ; and games needn't be ju s t i f ie d  ^
in  order to be understood—they 're  ju s t played. 5
W ittgenste in 's notion Of "grammar" could be stated b r ie f ly  in
the fo llow ing way. When he refers to the "grammar" o f a word (a proposition ,
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a phrase) he is pointing us to the way the word is used in our 
language: "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look 
at its  use and learn from that." [P I , #340.] The "grammar" of a 
word is the way i t  is used in lingu istic  t ra f f ic  (speaking and w ritin g ). 
This is not to say that Wittgenstein's method of clearing up philosophi­
cal problems simply involved looking at words. An important feature 
•o fh is  notion of "grammar" was that our language is conditioned by 
the world in which we live  and the circumstances.which surround speak­
ing a language.
Therefore looking to the "grammar" of words (propositions,
phrases) would be incomplete i f  we simply focused our attention on-
words. The significance of "grammar" for philosophical problems becomes
evident when we extend our considerations to the actions, a c tiv itie s ,
customs and conventions that surround our language:
Now, is i t  a real case of seeing or hearing?
Well, we call i t  that; we react with these words 
in particular situations. And we react to these 
words ip turn by particu lar actions.' [Z, #208.]
"Grammar" (in>Wittgenstein's sense) is not-just a system of rules for
speaking and w riting a language, or an enumeration of fundamental
principles but the rough ground of language as i t  is actually used
including the a c tiv itie s , the culture and conventions which surround
the uses of words.
Grammar is related to language because i t  involves a ll the 
sentences, words and phrases in our daily discourse. Both "grammar" 
and language are associated with our normal ways of speaking; i .e .
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the manifold games we play with words in the process of speaking a 
language. In addition,:, "grammar" is of c r it ic a l importance when 
dealing with philosophical questions.
For many years philosophers disputed questions such as "What
is being?" and "What is,time?" Wittgenstein'-s contribution to
philosophy is s ign if ican t because he chose tD deal with these and •
other philosophical questions in a new and d ifferent way. Instead
of attempting to resolve these age-old metaphysical Questions by trying
to grasp the "essence" of "being" and "time," Wittgenstein proposed
that we should look a t how we use these words in our language; "One
cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its  use and
learn from that."^ By looking to the uses of words, phrases and
sentences, Wittgenstein believed that our philosophical problems would
become clearer. We would discover our philosophical problems are
problems about the use of words:
I t  is not our aim to refine or complete the system 
of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of wa^ ys.
For the c la rity  that we are aiming at is indeed complete 
c la r ity . But this simply means that the. philosophical 
problems should completely disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of
stopping doing philosophy when I want to .— The one
that gives philosophy peace, so that i t  is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring its e lf  in question.— 
Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; 
and the series of examples can be broken o f f .—
Problems are solved (d iff ic u lt ie s  elim inated), not a 
single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are 
indeed methods, like  d ifferent therapies. [P I, #133.]
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According to Wittgenstein philosophy "is a battle  against the
7
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." Our philosophi­
cal problems are caused by a confusion, rather than a mistake. Perhaps 
we think that every string of words that can be put together expresses 
a possible state of a ffa irs  in the world. Grammar te lls  us which 
words and phrases have an application in our lives and which do not.
In this respect, "grammar" lets us determine whether a certain string  
of words is absurd; whether a particu lar philosophic inquiry is f r u it -
m!
less. Looking to the uses of words i .e .  "grammar" may not provide us 
with answers. Rather,' in our e ffo rt to deal with d if f ic u lt  philosophi­
cal problems, "grammar" helps us to re ject meaningless philosophical 
questions.
Wittgenstein and "Criteria"
>■
Stanley Cavell, in his excellent paper "The A va ilab ility  of
Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" te lls  us that,
What Wittgenstein means when he says that philosophy 
really  is descriptive is that i t  is descriptive of 
"our grammar," of " th e .c rite ria  we have" in under­
standing one another, knowing the world, and possess­
ing ourselves . Grammar is what language games are 
meant to reveal; i t  is because of this that they provide 
new ways of investigating concepts, and of c r it ic iz in g  
traditional philosophy. All th is , i t  should go without 
saying, is d if f ic u lt  to be clear about (Wittgenstein's 
own d iffic u lty  is not w i l l fu l ) ;  but i t  is what any e ffo rt  
to understand Wittgenstein must direct i ts e l f  toward. ‘8
"Criteria" is another important concept in Wittgenstein's 
philosophy. In-Chapter V, we w ill see that Wittgenstein's remarks on 
c r ite r ia  have a central role in Malcolm's account of dreaming. But for 
now, le t  us pause and consider the significance of th is concept in
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Wittgenstein's writings.
There are conflicting opinions among philosophers about What
Wittgenstein meant when he referred to "c rite r ia ."  This is not unusual
since most of Wittgenstein's discussion of "c rite ria" and his use of
the word "criterion" are anything but clear. In the Blue and Brown
Books, he makes a distinction between c rite r ia  and symptoms:
Let us introduce two an tithetica l terms in order to 
avoid certain elementary confusions: To the question
"How do you know that so-and-so is the case?", we 
sometimes answer by giving 'c r ite r ia ' and sometimes 
by giving 'symptoms'. I f  medical science calls  
angina an inflamation caused by a particu lar bacillus, 
and we ask in a particu lar case "why do you say this  
man has got angina?" then the answer "I have found 
the bacillus so-and-so in his blood" gives us the 
c rite rio n , or what we may call the defining criterion  
of angina: I f  on the other hand the answer was, "His
throat is inflamed", th is might give us a symptom of
angina. I call "symptom" a phenomenon o f which
experience has taught us that i t  coincided, in some 
way or other, with the phenomenon which is our 
defining criterio n . Then to say "A man has angina 
i f  this bacillus is found in him" is a tautology or 
i t  is a loose way of stating the defin ition  of "angina".
But to say, "A man has angina whenever he has an 
inflamed throat" is to make a hypothesis. 9
We might say, on the basis of this passage, that a criterion  ■ 
d iffe rs  from a symptom in being a decisive piece of evidence. At 
numerous places during his consideration of the phenomenon of dreaming, 
Malcolm equates a "criterion" with "something that settles a question 
with certainty":
/
The application of a c riterion  must be .able to y ie ld  
either an affirm ative or a negative result. 10
Considering th is , one may be inclined to think that 
there cannot be a criterion  (something that settles  
a question with certainty) of someone's having a sore
4
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fo o t or having d re a m t...^
Rogers A lb r it to n 's  account o f "c r ite r io n ,"  in  h is  a r t ic le  
, e n tit le d  "On W ittgenste in 's Use o f the Term C rite r io n ,"  also supports 
the opinion tha t a c r ite r io n  can be equated w ith a decisive piece o f 
evidence:
I t  is  p la in  enough, then, though W ittgenstein might 
have made i t  p la in e r, th a t in  the sense o f the passages 
I 'v e  quoted from the Blue Book the c r ite r io n  fo r  th is  
or th a t's  being so is ,  among other th ings, a lo g ic a lly  
s u ff ic ie n t condition o f i t s  being so. That is :  I f  I
f in d  in  a p a rtic u la r case th a t the c r ite r io n  fo r  a 
th in g 's  being so is  s a t is f ie d , what e n tit le s  me to 
claim tha t I thereby know the th ing to be so is  tha t 
the sa tis fa c tion  o f the c r ite r io n  en ta ils  tha t i t  is  so, 
in  the technical sense o f the word "e n ta ils "  in which 
i f  a man owns two suitcases, tha t en ta ils  tha t he owns 
some luggage. 12
But is  th is  notion o f c r ite r io n  W ittgente in 's?
That there are d ifferences and d i f f ic u l t ie s  in  in te rp re tin g
what W ittgenstein meant by " c r i te r ia "  and his use o f the word "c r ite r io n ,"
can be seen by considering the fo llow ing  passage:
But what i f  we went on asking:--"And why do you suppose 
tha t toothache corresponds to his holding his cheek 
ju s t  because your toothache corresponds to your holding 
your cheek?" You w i l l  be a t a loss to answer th is  
question, and ‘find  tha t here we s tr ik e  rock bottom, 
tha t is  we have come down to  conventions. { I f  you 
suggest as an answer to the la s t question th a t, whenever 
we've seen people holding th e ir  cheeks and asked them, 
what's the m atter, they have answered, " I  have too th­
ache" ,—remember tha t th is  experience only co-ordinates 
holding your cheek w ith  saying certa in  words.) 13
In th is  passage W ittgenstein suggests th a t a c r ite r io n  is  associated 
w ith learning language. A concept such as "toothache" becomes established 
as part o f our l in g u is t ic  reperto ire  once we learn to make connections
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
between certain kinds of behaviour and words. However, i t  is important
to note that with'respect to the question "How do you know that he has
toothache?" an appeal to a number of c r ite r ia  is possible:
Suppose that by observation^ I found that in certain  
cases whenever these f i r s t  c r ite r ia  told me a person 
had toothache, a red patch appeared on his cheek...
Now one may go on and ask: "How do you know that he
has got toothache when he holds his cheek?" The 
answer to this might be, "I say, ‘he1 has toothache 
when he holds his cheek because I hold my cheek when 
I have toothache".14
I f  we can appeal to a number-of c r ite r ia  to se ttle  a particu lar
question i t  is d if f ic u lt  to see how Wittgenstein could be held responsible
for the idea that a c riterion  is conclusive evidence on every topic.
For i f  there are two independent c r ite r ia 'fo r  a single state o f a ffa irs ,
i t  is possible that the two c r ite r ia  may conflic t: and in that case,
15 ‘at least one of- them is not decisive. The question is , "Can a number
■ of c r ite r ia  be accommodated by a concept without a conflict?"
Wittgenstein, at various places in the PI_ and elsewhere in his writings,
seems to admit that this is possible:
What does i t  mean to know who is in pain? I t  means, 
for example, to know which man in this room, is in 
pain: for instance, that i t  is  the one who is
s ittin g  over there, or the one who is  standing in
that corner, the ta l l  one over there with the fa ir  
hair, and so on.—What am I getting at? At the 
fact that there is a great variety of c r ite r ia  for 
personal 'id e n tity 1. [£I_, #404.]
But what is even more surprising, in lig h t of our discussion
i ' + ■
so fa r , is that in what follows these remarks, Wittgenstein suggests
that an appeal to "c rite ria"  is neither ju s tif ie d  or necessary. That
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is , with some'questions he intimates that an appeal to c r ite r ia  ceases
to play any role at a l l : .
What am I getting at? At the fact that there is a
great variety of c r ite r ia  for personal ‘ id e n tity 1. -
Now which of them determines rqy saying that T  am 
in pain? None. [P I , #404.]
We can sum up our discussion of "c rite ria"  in the following
way: Whether or not we choose to appeal to a criterion  or c r ite r ia
w ill depend on the kind of question being asked of us. I t  may be that
with some questions, our appeal to c r ite r ia  is restricted to that of
a single criterion  that w ill settle  the question with certainty.-However
there are circumstances in which an appeal to a number of c r ite r ia 'is
possible. .-What is important to note (with respect to Wittgenstein's
notion of "c rite r ia " ) "Ws that while a^ appeal to c r ite r ia  may be
■aij** possible in settling  a question, i t  may not always be necessary. That
is , i t  may be possible to settle  some questions without an appeal to
anything like  "c rite ria "  at a l l :
I t  is not part of Wittgenstein's thesis that a concept - 
* which has c rite r ia  is always employed on the basis of
c r ite r ia . The concepts of pain, mental images and of 
personal identity  have c r ite r ia  which Wittgenstein 
discusses at length’; but none of these c r ite r ia , he says, 
are applied when a man says of himself that he has a 
pain or an image. 16
J\ * •_
The d iff ic u lt ie s  that follow from equating a criterion  with a decisive 
piece of ev.idence for every question w ill become clearer when we con­
sider Malcolm's use of the word "criterion" with respect to the 
phenomenon of dreaming .in Chapter V. •<
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What is Involved in a Grammatical Investigation?
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the grammar of 
several philosophical problems connected with the phenomenon of dream­
ing. We have had occasion to examine a number of Wittgenstein's 
remarks on "grammar" ,and "c r ite r ia ."  Before proceeding with our analysis
of these problems, i t  is necessary to ask; "What is involved in a gram-
. •
matical investigation?"
We feel as i f  we had to penetrate phenomena: our
investigation, however, is directed not towards '
? phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the
'p o s s ib ilitie s ' of phenomena. We remind ourselves, 
that is to say, of the kind of statement that we 
make about phenomena. Thus Augustine recalls to 
mind the d iffe ren t statements -that are made about the 
duration, past present or future, of events. (These 
are, of course, not philosophical statements about 
time, the past, the present and the fu tu re .)
This quotation is from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.
I t  is followed by the one passage of.h is published work in which he
gives anything like  an explanation of what is involved in a grammatical
"Investigation:
Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. '
Such an investigation sheds lig h t on our problem 
by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings 
concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, 
by certain analogies between the forms of expression 
in d ifferent regions of language.— Some of them can 
be removed by substituting one form of expression for 
another; this may be called an "analysis" of our forms 
.o f expression, fo r the process is sometimes lik e  one 
of taking a thing apart. 18
I f  we take the above passage of Wittgenstein's to be-indicative
,\ • • v
of what is involved in a grammatical investigation then, a "grammatical
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In ve s tiga tion '1 would invo lve :
1) Compiling a l i s t  o f the uses o f the word{s) in  question;
'i,
2} The sub s titu tio n  o f one form .of expression fo r  another;
3} Examining certa in  analogies between the forms o f
expression 1n d if fe re n t regions o f language.
W ittgenstein te l ls  us tha t a grammatical investiga tion  sheds l ig h t  on
19philosophical problems by c lea ring  misunderstandings away. Since 
we w i l l  be concerned w ith  an inves tiga tion  in to  the grammar o f philoso­
phical problems associated w ith dreaming, i t  would be he lp fu l to fin d  
out why these moves, i .e .  compiling a l i s t  o f the uses o f a word, sub­
s t itu t in g  one form o f expression fo r  another, and examining certa in  
analogies, help us while doing philosophy.
In the Zettel W ittgenstein says:
Philosophical inves tiga tio ns : conceptual investiga tions.
The essential th ing about metaphysics: i t .o b lite ra te s
the d is tin c tio n  between factual and conceptual in ­
vestigations. [ 1, #458.}
Keep in  mind what we have said about W ittgenste in 's philosophy to th is  
po in t. I t  seems to me tha t w ith his phrase, "Philosophical investiga­
tio n s : conceptual in ve s tiga tio n s ," "Grammatical investiga tions" would
make a nice f i t  here as w e ll. According to W ittgenstein, a grammatical 
investiga tion  is  not directed toward phenomena, but toward concepts 
which embody the "p o s s ib il it ie s "  o f phenomena. A grammatical in v e s ti­
gation is  a type o f conceptual in ve s tig a tio n :
One reason W ittgenstein chose to describe his 
investigations as grammatical is  undoubtedly 
tha t his explorations are conceptual and are
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therefore inextricably bound up in language...
This is why Wittgenstein says that he exhibits 
a method by examples: he does not develop a
d e fin itive  repertoire of games which are to be 
played by his followers, but instead suggests by 
example a type of investigation which might be 
carried out in various situations. He also tries  
to suggest.the need for such an investigation by 
describing typical circumstances where i t  is useful 
as a means to clear vision. Although this ther­
apeutic "game" has some s im ila rities  with the games 
and calculations i t  trea ts , i t  is ultimately unlike 
them insofar as i t  must remain open-ended and 
.respofisive to whatever therapeutic needs arise: . ’
" . . .  this description gets i t  lig h t, that .is to 20 
say its  purpose--from the philosophical problems."
Philosophers, psychologists, clergy and the common man have 
always taken an active in terest in dreams. Nevertheless, the phenomenon 
of dreaming raises certain problems which philosophers have gone to 
great lengths to resolve. For some time now, scholars have disputed
questions such as "What is a dream?" "What is the essence of dreaming?"
»
In Chapters I and I I  we noticed that a sim ilar debate, o f special in­
terest to philosophy, revolves around the question "Am I awake or 
asleep and dreaming?" What a ttracts  our attention is  that with respect 
to both the sceptical question "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" 
and questions pertaining to the essence of dreaming, philosophers have 
not yet been able to reach any conclusive answers.
The fact that philosophers have been unable to resolve these 
problems associated with dreaming suggests that some other solution 
is wanting, or perhaps that no solution is possible. I t  is for this 
reason that I choose to adopt a Wittgensteinian perspective toward a
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number of problems associated withcadreaming that have plagued the
history of philosophy thus fa r . In the following chapters, I intend
to investigate the grammar of two questions: 1) "Am I awake or asleep
and dreaming?", 2) "Are dreams composed o f, or identical with any kind
of mental phenomenon occurring during sleep?" This approach finds its
inspiration and encouragement from the wide variety of Wittgenstein's
remarks which I have supplied in this chapter. I t  is my opinion that
Wittgenstein's remarks on "grammar" and "c rite ria" have direct bearing
4
on the problems I have c ited , and that a grammatical investigation w ill 
y ie ld  a profitable result when we come to consider philosophical questions 
connected with dreaming. I argue that, in lig h t of continuing d iff ic u lty  
on the part of philosophers to make headway with these problems, a 
Wittgensteinian perspective provides the most plausible alternative  
as a way of tackling these questions that philosophy can pursue.
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CHAPTER IV
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE GRAMMAR OF WORDS, PHRASES AND 
STATEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH DREAMING
Contemporary sceptics e.g. Peter Unger, F ritz  Mauthner,maintain
<
that the question "Am i  awake or asleep and dreaming?" is a legitimate
question for philosophy and that although we may think we are awake
there is always the possib ility  that we are asleep and dreamingJ
Philosophers have attempted to silence the sceptic with arguments
designed to discredit the sceptic's position and question but in doing
2
so have raised additional questions. One query, aroused by Norman
Malcolm's treatment of dreams and of particular in terest to contemporary
philosophers is , "Are dreams.composed o f, or identical with any .kind
3
of mental phenomenon occurring during sleep?"
Malcolm is reluctant to define what a dream is or provide a
defin ition of dreaming: "I am not trying to say what dreaming is : I
4
do not understand what i t  would mean to do that."  The d iffic u lty  is 
to see how Malcolm is ju s tifie d  in arguing that dreams are none of the 
things that philosophers have commonly supposed them to be. The question 
"Are dreams composed o f, or identical with any kind of mental phenomenon 
occurring during sleep?" that remains unanswered by Malcolm's accoupt 
of dreaming s t i l l  leaves the. essence of dreams to be decided.
How then might we begin to approach these philosophical problems
38
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associated with dreaming? The history o f somewhat successful but
4
inconclusive, attempts to resolve the traditional sceptical problem 
associated with dreaming and questions pertaining to the essence of 
dreams leaves one frustrated. Our frustration leads us to think that 
perhaps a- defin ition of the word "dream" or an empirical explanation 
of dreaming is what is really  necessary. At #374 of RPP^Wittgenstein 
states that he does not intend to provide a defin ition  of the word
C
"dfeam'l 'but to describe the use of the word. In this chapter I w ill 
explore the a lternative suggested by Wittgenstein by investigating  
the grammar of words, phrases and statements associated with dreaming.
We note that a grammatical investigation is a type of conceptual 
investigation.6 Wittgenstein suggests that a grammatical investigation  
concerns the use of words: "One cannot guess how a word functions! Oneb
has to look at its  use and learn from that."^ Describing the use of 
the word "dream" may clear up certain confusions about our concept of 
dreaming in such a way that our d iff ic u lty  with the questions cited 
above may a t las t be revealed. For this reason I now wish to turn our ' 
attention to the word "dream" and how we use i t  in the English language.
I w ill begin by enumerating a number of examples in which the 
word "dream" is used in the ordinary way. By looking at the way we use 
the word "dream,".we w ill be able to draw some philosophical conclusions 
which w ill allow us to re-examine the positions of both the sceptic and 
Malcolm with new insight. Instead of providing the reader with a l is t  
of short sentences, each example has been given a context. This method 
not only adds " life "  to our procedure but supplies deta ils  about the
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occasion when the word "dream" is  used. These pa rticu la rs  w i l l  play 
a s ig n if ic a n t ro le  in  our discussion o f context la te r  in  the chapter. 
Here then are a number o f uses o f the word "dream" as they would appear 
in  our everyday discourse.
1. A group o f musicians are s i t t in g  around a table a t a 
party discussing th e ir  upcoming tour through the United 
States. The drummer says to the lead g u ita r is t ,  " I  
suppose th a t I ' l l  have to leave you fellows sooner or 
la te r . My dream is  to become the president o f Petro-Can."
2. I t ' s  the fou rth  quarter o f the f in a l game o f the NFL
season. The D e tro it Lions are leading the Pittsburgh
Steelers w ith  a score o f 27 to 24. There is  less than a 
minute o f play le f t  in  the game. Bradshaw c a lls  the play, 
fakes-back and f l ip s  a pass to Franco H arris. Harris runs
• 65 yards fo r  a toychdown, winning thejjam p^for the Steelers.
Later in the dressing room, Cosell approaches Harris fo r  .
comment. H arris: "Wow, a great game. That pass from
T e rry ... i t  was lik e  a dre'am come tru e ."
3. There are fra n t ic  steps as a c h ild  runs from his room down 
the s ta irs  to his mother. He jumps up on the sofa; eyes 
f i l le d  w ith  tears and shouts, "Mommy, there was a big black 
cat tha t chased me a l l  around my room. I t  had red eyes, 
big white teeth and paws as big as . . . "  His mother re p lie s , 
"Quiet, Sam. Quiet. There's no need to worry, honey.
You must have had a bad dream."
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One thing to notice about the questions 1) "Am I awake or 
asleep and dreaming?" and 2) "Are dreams composed o f, or identical 
with any kind of mental phenomenon during sleep?" is that the word 
"dream" is used in two d iffe ren t ways. In the sceptic's question (1) 
i t  appears as gerund, i .e .  "dreaming." With the other contemporary 
question associated with dreaming "Are dreams composed of, . . . "  i t  is 
used as a noun. A l i t t l e  reflection w ill te l l  us that the word "dream" 
has a variety of uses: as a noun, "I had a dream las t night," as a gerund, 
" It  must have happened while I was dreaming" and as an adjective,
"She seems dreamy today." Our description of the use of the word 
"dream" then, would not be complete without enumerating occasions where 
other words, (variants of the word "dream") appear in our everyday 
discourse. Let us now turn to these examples as a way of enlarging 
upon our description of the use of the word "dream."
4. I t  is Christmastime and the family has gathered around 
the television set. Bing Crosby appears on the screen 
dressed in a leisure suit. He begins to complain about 
the lack .of Christmas s p ir it ,  the absence of snow on the 
ground and then breaks into song, "I'm dreaming of a White 
Christmas."
5. Madge Smithson has been dating Tpm^Elliot for ten years.
Tom and I have been invited to a housewarming party in the 
neighbourhood. Tom explains that Madge w ill be arriving
a l i t t l e  la te . We head up to the party without her. Two 
hours la te r , there is a knock'at the door. Madge enters
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on the arm of a mutual frlencl, Dick Washburn and announces 
th e ir  engagement. Tom grabs my arm and groans, "Am I 
dreaming?"
6 . Jim's father decided to catch a l i t t l e  shut-eye a fte r  
dinner* He puts up the lazyboy chair and dozes o ff .
From the kitchen Jim and his mother hear the father shout, 
"Shoot kid, shoot! Boy, that kid can skate." Jim peeks 
around the corner and notices his father sleeping.
Returning to the kitchen he shakes his head. Jim's mother: 
" I guess he's dreaming of the hockey tournament this  
weekend."
7. Sandy Hawley, top Canadian jockey, has ju s t finished one 
of his poorest races. When asked for comment he said, 
"Indeed not a very good race at a l l .  For a while I_thought
* the horse was holding back, just about ready to give her
a ll and we would have a chance. • But as I entered the 
Clubhouse turn, I knew I was dreaming."
8 . An assembly of executives is seated in a boardroom, ready 
to discuss a new advertising campaign fo r B r illo  Soap Pads. 
One of the senior members of the firm , confronts a junior 
in the organization, "Jack, for years we have been stuck 
for a motto, something catchy, that w ill keep our consumer 
audience thinking about B rillo  Soap Pads. Have you any 
ideas?" Jack Fontana pauses then replies, "S ir, I have •
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already taken care of i t .  How is this? TOUGH AS NAILS,
SOFT AS A PILLOW, DIRT DISAPPEARS WHEN YOU SCRUB WITH 
BRILLO." The president .glances to the senior member who 
asked the question and whispers, “Just what we need. I 
wonder when Fontana dreamt that one up."
9. A group of professional men and th e ir wives are engaged
in conversation at a cocktail party. B, a Philosophy pro­
fessor, begins te llin g  a dream to the others seated around 
him: "I dreamt that we were hunting in North Africa.
Suddenly angry natives appeared and took us_ prisoners."
(C, a medical doctor, who was away fixing a drink, enters 
the conversation at th is pointfj. B, “I t  was a ll very frighten­
ing. -One of the natives had a knife with which he cut a 
series of small “x's" on the back of my w ife ’s neck."
The doctor excuses himself from the group and goes over to 
B's w ife , who was chatting at the bar. C, the medical 
doctor, says, "Hope you do not think me rude, but could 
you pull your hair up for a moment. I want to examine 
those scars on your neck." B's wife laughs and pointing 
to her husband, says, "Oh, that story again, he dreamt i t . "
10. "I dreamt that I was walking in a forest. Suddenly an angry 
grizzly  bear appeared and began to chase me. I t  was a ll  
very frightening. In making my escape I sustained a number 
of scratches on my arms and legs."
11. " I f  we attempt to in terpret a typical dream, the dreamer
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fa ils  as a rule to produce the associations which would
>
in other cases have led us to understanding, or else his
arssocfations become obscurevso that we cannot solve our
~ 8 problem without th e ir help." .
12. Jane Lockwood, a regular at the Nagshead Tavern, loves to
boast. Tonight she comes in , sits down, and begins te llin g
Iher g irlfriends about a date she has with Bart, the captain 
of the football team. Constantly c ircu lating , she picks up 
her drink, moving from table to table searching for a new 
audience. One of her g irlfriends tugs the sleeve of another, 
"Gee I hope^what she said is n 't  true. Things have been 
going really  well between Bai^ and me." The other g ir l 
replies, "Don't worry about Jane, she's just a dreamer."
From these examples, the reader w ill notice that the word "dream"
• appears in a number of. d ifferent contexts. Can we say that there is a
univocal meaning for a word like  "dream?" With the examples I have
provided there does not seem to be. In number 1 the word "dream" is  
\  . ' - 
•^used to express a hope or wish. In number 2 the "dream" is a football
pass that is just righ t. F inally , in example 3 the word "dream’^ s
7 ‘  'used to describe events or disturbing experiences which take place while 
someone is asleep. Notice in example 1, a "dre^m" is a hope or wish.
A hope or wish seems to be fa ir ly  compatible with the meaning of the
i -w
word "dream" that appears in example 2; that is , a football phss that
is ideal for a particu lar situation. However, a hope or a wish is not
comparable to a person having a frightening experience such as the
t
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"dream" referred to in example 3. Therefore, we cannot say that there 
is*a single meaning or defin ition that would be suitable for every use 
of the word "dream."
What about these other wd(rds, i .e .  "dreaming," "dreamt," that 
we have^considered.in the remainde^ of the examples? Do we find the 
same meaning appearing in every/example? Not at a l l .  With each exfltople 
i t  is possible to construct a phrase which captures the meaning of the 
original use of the word, Ndhat I intend to do is take a reformulated
t . ,
phrase, substitute i t  in an alternate example, and see i f  i t  makes a 
good f i t .  I f  the new (ford or phrase preserves the original meaning 
of the word or phrase (\n the alternate example then the meaning of the 
word w ill be the same. I f  the reformulated phrase renders the passage 
incoherent and disrupts the sense of the example, then the meaning of 
the word w ill be d iffe ren t.
On page 43, we find two examples that p ro file  the use of the 
word "dreamer." In example 11, Freud's statement could be reformulated 
this way: " I f  we attempt to in terpret a typical dream the person fa ils
m
as a rule to produce the associations..." Freud's use of the word
"dreamer" refers to theclass of»individuals who dream. Therefore, we
can substitute a number of other words 4n place of "dreamer" (man,
woman, a person who dreams) and the original sense of the passage is
preserved. What happens when we take the reformulate;} phrase or word
* *  
from example 1 and substitute i t  in example 12? Here is the result,
"The other g ir l rep lies , "Don't worry about Jane, she's just a woman
who dreams." Immediately 'we.get the feeTing that something has gone
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askew here. Why is  th is  so? The answer is  obvious. The meaning o f '
the word "dreamer" in  each o f the two cases is  not the same.
The reformulated phrase "a person who dreams" fa i ls  to make
a good f i t  in example 12 because Freud is  using the word "dreamer" in
%
its . basic sense, tha t is  in  which a person cannot dream unless he is  
asleep. In example 12, Janets g ir lf r ie n d  could have sa id , "Don’ t  
worry about Jane; she like s  to t e l l  s to r ie s ."  -But notice here the word 
"dream" is  being used in fo rm a lly , w ithout the im p lica tion  tha t a person 
needs to be asleep_J^n^der"to be a "dreamer." This method o f reformu­
la tin g  phrases and su b s titu tin g  them in  a lte rn a tive  examples again makes 
us aware tha t the word "dream" does not have^y^nea^ is  shared
by a l l  o f i t s  uses.
What can we say about the grammar o f the word "dream?" Faced 
■with such a mixed bag o f meanings, must we approach each i^se o f the
word as an ind iv idua l caSe,? Or, is  there a dominant or fundamental
<#
feature to any o f these uses of the word "dream?" In the Philosophical
Investigations W ittgenste in ' s ta te s : r
People who on waking t e l l  us ce rta in  incidents 
(th a t they have been ijt  such-and-such places, e tc . ) .
Then we teach them the expression " I  dreamt", which 
precedes the na rra tive . Afterwards I sometimes ask 
them "did you dream anything la s t night?" and am 
answered yes or no, sometimes w ith  an account o f a dream, 
sometimes not. That is  the language-game. [P I , p. 184].
I t  is  evident from our inves tiga tion  in to  the use o f the word "dream"
tha t the language-game'of te l l in g  dreams is  not the only language-game
in  which uses o f the word "dream" a rise . We have seen tha t the words
"dream" and "dreaming" are used in  other s itua tio ns  fa r  removed from
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the language-game o f te l l in g  dreams which W ittgenstein ou tlines above.
o f a context and i ts  s ign ificance fo r  philosophical problems associated 
w ith dreaming can be had by re fe rr in g  back to a number o f our examples. 
In example 6, suppose Jim's mother were to ask, "What was i t  you were 
dreaming about?" a fte r  his fa the r had awakened. Would th is  cause a 
breakdown in  communication between these two people? I f a i l  to see i t  
happening here. A question lik e  th is  would not be out o f place in th is  
s itu a tio n  because the word “dreaming" is  being used in  the basic sense 
in  which a person cannot "dream" unless he is  asleep.
I f  a statement occurs in  the proper context, i t  makes sense. 
That is ,  i t  has a place in  the p a rtic u la r language-game in  which i t  is  
being used. Context has a strong influence on the grammar o f the 
statements we make and the questions we ask. This is  evident i f  we 
consider what i t  would be lik e  fo r  someone to make statements, or ask 
questions, out o f context. I f  one o f the members o f the fam ily in 
example 4 were to ask Dad why Bing Crosby neglected to give an account 
o f what he was dreaming o f,  (say in  the form o f na rra tive) the fa ther 
would be a t a loss fo r an answer. He would th ink tha t the person was
;uch as, "What is  i t  he is  dreaming about?" would re f le c t  a misunder­
standing about the way the word "dream" was being used by Crosby in  
th is ^ p a rtic u la r context.
You are standing in  a group o f reporters (example 7) when Sandy
I f  we look a t a ll the examples I have provided, each-use o f 
the word "dream" occurs in  a context. Perhaps the best explanation
jok ing  or had missed the s ign ificance o f Crosby's song. A question
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Hawley is approached for comment about the horse race. What i f  one 
of the reporters were to ask him, "What was i t  you were dreaming about?" 
Surely this question would be odd, given the context surrounding this  
particular use of the word, "dream." In this example the word "dreaming" 
is being used informally (f ig u ra tiv e ly ). Hawley might ju s t as easily  
have said, "For a while I thought the horse was holding back, just 
about ready to give her a ll and we would have a chance. But as I 
entered the Clubhouse turn, 1 realized I d idn 't have a chance of winning 
the race." A question as to what Hawley was dreaming about would also 
re flec t a misunderstanding about the use of the word, because i t  would 
suggest another context, i .e .  that he was asleep and dreaming while 
jockeying a horse around a race track.
I f  a statement occurs out of context, i t  ceases to have sense 
for us; and for this reason, a statement or question can be meaningful 
only in an appropriate context. In example 6 , the question, "What was 
i t  you were dreaming about?" makes sense because i t  occurs within the 
language-game of te llin g  dreams, i .e .  the proper context (Jim's father 
was asleep in his easy chair and said some things relating to events 
that could not be taking place at that time). People do not dream (in  
the basic sense of the word) when they run a horse race during waking 
hours. The physical and mental co-ordination required to jockey a 
horse around a racetrack just does not allow the possib ility  of befog 
asleep or a question such as, "What was i t  you were dreaming about?" 
to gain a foothold here.
f
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This is not to say that the use of the word "dreaming" in 
examples 4 and 7 1s incoherent and u n in te llig ib le . In each case 
(Crosby and Hawley) the use of the word is acceptable given the con­
text. Most of us who are fam iliar with the English language under­
stand what Crosby is' saying when he sings "I'm dreaming of a White 
Christmas. 1 The word "dreaming" in this case is figurative or metaphori­
cal, used to express a hope or a wish for more snow. Consequently, 
this use of the word "dreaming" should be distinguished from other 
uses where accounts of a dream or questions such "Did you dream last 
night?" are an integral part of the language-game. At this point what 
is worthy of our attention is that the-word "dream" appears in many 
d iffe ren t situations or language-games, ( i f  you w i l l ) .  The language- 
game of te llin g  dreams that Wi-ttgenstein refers to on page 184 of the 
Investigations is only one of a host of other language-games which 
involve the use of the word “dream."
We would do well to concentrate our e ffo rts  on the use of the 
word "dream" where questions such as, "Did you dream last night?" are 
part of the grammar. Generally i t  is these and not figurative uses 
of the^ord "dream" that have been the source of debate throughout the 
history of philosophy. I t  is d if f ic u lt  to draw meaningful conclusions 
regarding metaphorical uses of the word “dream." Although these uses 
have been considered, philosophers appear to agree that they fa i l  to 
play a s ignificant role with questions pertaining to the phenomenon 
of dreaming. Let us re s tric t our focus to only those uses in which a
r -  . - «
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person cannot dream unless he is asleep. I w ill re fer to these uses
of the word "dream" as examples of the basic sense of the word.
The basic sense of the word "dream" is  employed in several of
the examples I have provided. Here is an example that allows us to
»
make some substantial observations with respect to the grammar of
phrases and sentences associated with "dreaming." Consider this as a
synthesis of the relevant statements contained in example number .9:
I dreamt that we were hunting in North Africa.
Suddenly angry natives appeared and took us prisoners.
I t  was a ll very frightening. One of the natives had 
a knife with which he cut a series of small "x's" on 
the back of my w ife 's  neck.
Is there anything unusual about the individual.words and phrases the
professor has used to give an account of his dream? At f i r s t  glance
there does not seem to be. The language that we use to te l l  our dreams
is identical to the individual words and phrases we use to describe
events and experiences in our waking l i f e ,  with one exception; the
use o f the phrase "I dreamt" which precedes the narrative.
What is the function^of the expression "I dreamt?" How does
i t  a ffec t the grammar of the rest of the narrative that follows it?
Let us address ourselves to each of these questions separately. I f
the professor does not use the expression "I dreamt" to preface his
narrative, what would follow? One conclusion must be that he is no
longer te llin g  a dream. The professor would be giving an account of
9a series of events that actually happened:
We were hunting in North Africa. Suddenly angry 
natives appeared and took us prisoners. I t  was
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a ll  very frightening. One of the natives had a 
knife with which he cut a series of small "x's" 
on the back of rny w ife 's neck.
Yet, I am sure that we would agree that there is a difference between 
these two narratives.
The difference between the two narratives involves a distinction  
which I have decided to 'ca ll the "dream-distinction." I t  can be 
articulated in the following manner. I f  the events that the professor 
describes actually happened, he would be giving a truthful account of 
events and experiences that occurred while he was awake. What follows 
from this? I f  you asked him to produce evidence of his tr ip  to Africa 
(e .g . plane ticke ts , photographs, African a rtifa c ts , e tc .) he would 
be able to meet your requests. Further, you could quiz him on tidb its  
of African culture that only a visitc/r to the country would be aware 
of. F inally , i f  you examined his w ife's neck, the scars made by the 
knife would be there.
However, in example 9, B (the philosophy professor) uses the 
expression "I dreamt." Although he uses the same words and phrases he 
would te llin g  a story, had i t  actually happened, he iden tifies  his nar­
rative  as a dream. The phrase "I dreamt" acts as a signal, an announce­
ment that these words and phrases should not be taken in the same sense 
as an account describing events and experiences had they actually  
happened in his waking l i f e .  The "dream-distinction," once announced, ■ 
affects a ll the words and phrases that go into the remainder o f the 
narrative. I t  carries with i t  the implication that the language-game 
of te llin g  dreams is an extension of language-games about actual
V
■ . \  '
' \
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experiences, but now qualified with the phrase "I dreamt. 11
At various places in the PI_Wittgenstein invents a language-
game for the purpose of c larify ing  a concept (.see PI_, #64, 8 6 , 143).
*
He says in a footnote on'page 56 of the Investigations that:
What we have to mention in order to explain the 
significance, I mean the importance, of a concept, 
are often extremely general facts of nature: such
facts as are hardly ever mentioned because of th e ir  
great generality. [PJ_, p. 56.]
What is interesting about the concept of dreaming is that we have not 
found i t  necessary to create a new language-game in order to te ll  our 
dreams. Our English vocabulary and normal ways of speaking work just 
fine.
What would a new language, invented for the purpose of te llin g  
drealrfs, be like? Imagine this case: We encounter a tribe  in the forests 
of New Guinea. They have devised a new technique of te llin g  their  
dreams. Whenever one of the members of the tribe  recounts a dream, 
a ll nouns and object words in the dream narrative are pronounced back­
wards. This jargon prevents other members of the tribe  from confusing 
accounts of waking experiences with dreams. But since we know the 
language-games in both cases, would the need to do this ever arise?
I do not think so; and this only brings out something about the concept 
of dreaming. In the preceding example, the natives of New Guinea 
distinguish ordinary narratives from dream narratives by using a d iffe r ­
ent vocabulary. However this language-game of te llin g  dreams employed 
by these natives would be odd, unlike anything we are fam iliar with.
i
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9We do not employ a d ifferent language-game to distinguish dream 
.'narratives from the ordinary accounts of events and experiences in 
our waking l i f e .  We prefix our accpunts with the expression "I dreamt" 
and this is a ll that is needed to identify  what we are te l king about: 
"People who on waking, te ll  us certain incidents... Then we teach them
the expression 'I  dreamt1 which precedes the narrative  That i s ‘the
language-game."^
How then does the phrase "I dreamt" affect the grammar of the 
rest of the narrative that follows it?  Whenever we give an account of 
a dream, people have no problem understanding what we say. In this  
respect the expression "I dreamt" alters the narrative and is intimately
V
linked with the sentences that follow i t .  A number of philosophers,
including Wittgenstein, have revealed an awareness of the "dream-
distinction" by articu lating  this point in the following way:
I f  I say I dreamt that I had a conversation with Ryle, 
or that University College was on f i r e ,  i t  seems 
incontestable that i t  makes no .sense to ask whether 
i t  was really  Ryle, or really  University College . . . .
I said I dreamt i t ,  and this means that no real con­
versation occurred, that i t  would be senseless to 
see i f  Ryle himself would confirm its  occurrence, or 
to enquire whether he and I were geographically 
close enough for i t  to be possible. 11
When I report what I did or saw or heard or thought 
\ in my dream, I am talking about a character in my dream.
^ This, use of the f i r s t  person singular in the narration 
of the dream is no more unusual or paradoxical than 
the use of proper names of actual persons. The relation  
between the character and the actual person is one of 
representation: in his dream, a character representing
the dreamer may d iffe r  as completely from him, and 
from his conception of himself, as the other characters 
may d iffe r  from the actual persons they represent. 12
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
vv
I t  could only be by accident that a man's dreams 
about the futune of philosophy, a r t ,  science, should 
come true. What he sees in his dreams is an extension 
.o f his own world, PERHAPS what he wishes (and perhaps 
not), but not re a lity . 13
There is ordinarily  no request for evidence or proof to substantiate 
our accounts of dreams. For example, i t  would be very strange i f  a 
group of peopJ-eT- listening to the professor in example 9, were .to 
suddenly jump up and whisk over to examine his w ife's neck. This kind 
of thing jus t does not happen when someone te lls  of a dream. A question 
such as, "Could you show me your plane tickets?" or an anamination of 
the w ife 's neck are out of place with the language-game of te llin g  
dreams. Once the phrase "I dreamt" is announced, an important d istinc­
tion shifts into gear. .People have no d iff ic u lty  distinguishing the 
dream narrative from the ordinary one.
Why do I go to great length to point out the significance of 
this "dream-distinction?" The professor has told a story about a 
frightening encounter in Africa. But i f  the experiences mentioned in 
his dream narrative were actual 'experiences, his wife would have sustained 
in juries from the series of events he has described. I f  you examined 
his w ife 's  neck the scars made by the knife mentioned in his narrative  
would be there. The ^ c t  is they are not. What sense then can we make 
of the natives, the ^cars and the fear mentioned in the professor's 
dream narrative? I f  we keep in mind that the use of the phrase "I 
dreamt" qualifies the remainder of the words, phrases and sentences 
which follow i t ,  there is nothing to suggest that we have to make any 
sense of them at a l l .
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The "dream-distinction" outlined above is helpful in pointing 
out the way in which dream narratives differ-from  ordinary narratives 
about events and experiences in our waking l i f e .  Keep in mind, though, 
that the language-game of te llin g  dreams is only one of a number of 
language-games in which the word "dream" is used. Because the state­
ments which follow the phrase “I dreamt" bear such strong s im ilarity  
to those which describe waking events and experiences, i t  is possible 
that th i‘5 distinction may be overlooked. And in some cases, where our 
questions have nothing to do with the language-game of te llin g  dreams 
i t  might even be forgotten altogether.
At #90 of the Investigations Wittgenstein te lls  us that a 
grammatical investigation sheds lig h t on philosophical .problems by 
clearing misunderstandings away, "misunderstandings concerning the 
use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between 
the forms, of expression in d ifferent regions of language."^ Up to 
this point our investigation has involved looking at the use of the 
word "dream," its  grammar and the context or occasions in which the
use of the word can be found. We w ill now be interested, not with the“
/•
many and varied uses of the word "dream," but with looking at certain
forms of expression that bear a strong grammatical s im ilarity  to the
forms of expression in which the use of the word "d reW  appears.
The fact that Wittgenstein directs us to examine forms of
expression from "different regions of language" is s ignificant. He has
said that the whole process-of using words, "consisting of language and
15the actions into which i t  is woven can be called the 'language-game.'"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
However, a t various places in  the PI_, he points out th a t there are an
• I *  *  ' 'innumerable number o f "language-games" which are subsumed under the
>
wor^. "language" ( in  th is  respect, see his remarks a t f/23 o f the P I) .
Given the p lu ra lity  o f language-games i t  is  easy to see tha t one "game,"
whose te r r i to r y  is  not-sharply defined, might shade o f f  in to  another.
*
I maintain tha t th is  is where W ittgenstein believed our misunderstand-
*
ings about the uses of words and concepts have th e ir  roo t.
A grammatical analogy is  a form o f expression tha t has a strong
surface s im ila r ity  when compared w ith another form o f expression. A
form o f expression may be a phrase or a sentence. What is  important is
th a t, though the two forms o f expression seem to be s im ila r to each
other, a closer examination w i l l  reveal tha t they are not tha t s im ila r
a t a l l .  'Once-we fe r re t out the meaning o f each phrase or sentence and
what follows from i t ,  we see tha t there are substantia l differences
between the two.
O.K. Bouwsma, in  his paper " I  Have In Sleep Been Deceived,"
draws our a tten tion  to a p a ir o f statements which have a strong s im ila r ity
to the expression "X te l ls  a dream":
What do I mean by a grammatical analogy?
Compare the fo llow ing sentences:
Peter te l ls  his dream.
Peter te l ls  a story. -jg 
Peter te l ls  what happened.
Let us begin by considering the ways in which te l l in g  a dream is  s im ila r
to te l l in g  a s to ry / te l l in g  what happened. A young man has recently •
witnessed a car accident. Here is  his account:
As I reca ll I had ju s t purchased a package o f c igars, 
le f t  the smokeshop and was standing on the corner,
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waiting for the lig h t to change. The lig h t had 
turned green, but I hesitated, hearing the sound of 
a car horn piercing the a ir .  Turning to the r ig h t, 
I gasped as a big blue Cadillac screamed into the 
intersection, smashing into the t ra f f ic  that had 
the right of way. I t  was te rr ib le ! There was ■ 
broken glass, blood and twisted metal everywhere.
In my opinion, i t  was one of the worst accidents 
I have ever seen.
With a few a lterations, a substitution of a phrase or'two and
some editing, this report could -also stand as an example of a dream
The s im ila rities  between the sentences "Peter te lls  a dream," "Peter 
te lls  a story," "Peter te lls  what happened" are fa ir ly  obvious. All 
three :es, i .e .  te llin g  a dream, te llin g  a story, te llin g  what
happen alike in that they use the English language. As w ell,
most of the words and phrases used in the practice of te llin g  what 
happened/telling a story are used in a dream narrative. . All three 
practices involve " te llin g ;"  that is the details o f the story are 
expressed in words and spoken or communicated to an audience of one 
or more persons, w illin g  to lis ten  to the account. F ina lly , te llin g  
a dream, te llin g  a story and te llin g  what happened require a memory 
process. This suggests that a ll three are sim ilar in that they invol 
"remembering" something that happened in the past.
examples of what he means by a "grammatical analogy," is not so much
one might recount on awakening:
s
As I recall I dreamt that I had just purchased a 
package of cigars, le f t  thesmokeshop and was standing
on the corner waiting for the lig h t to change___
There was broken glass, blood and twisted metal 
everywhere. That was when I woke up.
Bouwsma's intention, in citing the above "language-games" as
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to make us aware of the s im ila rity  between the grammar of the three 
practices but to point us toward how they d iffe r . Perhaps the most 
important difference between te llin g  a'dream and te llin g  a .s tory /te l 1 ing 
what happened concerns the problem of v erific a tio n . I f  Peter were to  
relate the details of the car accident, (mentioned on the previous page)
i .e .  te l l  a s to ry /te ll what happened, there are a number of avenues that 
we could take to verify  his account. We could:
( 1 ) ask him for the exact date, time and location of the
accident;
( 2 ) v is it  the smokeshop and ask the pwner to corroborate
his story; ' „
(3 ) search out old copies of the newspaper that might include 
some of the deta ils .o f t!he accident;
(4 ) consult police records to obtain particulars as to who 
was involved, how i t  happened, witnesses1 statements 
etc .;-.
(5) approach some of these witnesses (car owners, pedestrians) 
to get th e ir side of the story.
On the basis of this l i s t ,  there seems to be a large variety of ways that 
we could put together a package of details which would allow us to judge 
whether Peter was te llin g  the tru th , i .e .  verify  his account.
What i f  Peter were to relate the same accident, but only in the
form of a dream narrative? Peter wakes up in the morning and te lls  me
his dream. Can I-say anything to contest his report or attempt to amend' 
it?  Clearly, we are in a bind as to what avenues we could take to verify
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what Peter has said. What alterations C0 UJ^ } 1 make? What questions 
could I ask? I t  is important to note that i f  Peter t e l l^ a  dream, his
t>
account of the accident cannot be substantiated by police records, news­
papers or testimony /from ot&er wi)tyfesses'>- The statements that make up 
Peter’ s dream narrative are peculiar in that they are restricted to his- 
testimony alone. I believe i t  is jo r  this reason that there has never 
been a trad ition  of verification/associated with dream'narratives:
That is , dream repdi^ts are singular, in that they 
carry with themselves"^special self-establishing truth - 
that is d istinct from any other notion of truthfulness 
or usual methods of checking veracity. And this is 
almost as much as to say that "truth" does not apply x. 
here at a l l . 17
The second point to notice about the grammatical ^analogy Bouwsma 
cites is that praise and blame do not apply to dream narratives. We can 
bring this important difference to Ijight by examining what follows fro ii^ ^  
a typical example of someone's tel.ling a dream. Consider example 10, page 
43, as a case in point:
Peter te l ls  a dream: "I dream tthat I was walking in a forest. ^
i Suddenly an angry grizzly  bear appeared
\  and began to chase,me. I t  was a ll very
frightening. In making my escape I 
sustained a number of scratches on my 
arms and legs."
Peter te lls  a stbry: "I was walking in a forest. Suddenly an
Peter te lls  what angry grizzly  bear appeared and began to
happened: chase me. I t  was a ll very frightening.
' In making my escape I sustained a number
' of scratches on my arms and legs."
ppose. that Peter really  had this^encounter with a g rizz ly  bear.
his story*as an account of events th^t, actually took place
things would follow from his narrative, in this case praise and
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blame. Let's say Peter relates this encounter to his friends at school.
I t ’s easy to see how they^might compliment him on his qufck w it and
* jv  *
a g ili ty ,  "Peter, you were very lucky to escape. You lltust be a good runner,"*
or ^That's a dandy p^ample of some re a l’fancy footwork." In this pase 
they could praise Petqlr on the basis of his account and ^hei r praise would 
be ju s tifie d .
The same result is obtained with respect to blame i f  we consider 
what i t  would be like  ’i f  Peter returned home an'd related the encounter 
with the grizzly  bear to his parents. Immediately a fte r he finishes his 
story, his mother begins to chastise him, "When w ill you ever learn to 
'"take care of y.ourself? Don't you realize you could have been killed?" '
Could we*say that the mother's comments are unwarrante'd?-- I do not see 
how we could. The fact that Peter is te llin g  a story about what actually  
happerjefTin the forest, leaves him open to these and other critic ism s,
"You should never have gone out walking in the forest alone. In future, 
bring a friend or a gun." Therefore, his mother's rebuke is to ta lly
4
acceptable.
But what i f  this encounter with the grizzly.bear is an account 
of a dream Peter had, say the night before? In this case moral predicatesN
such as praise and blame, would have no place here. Why should he be praised 
or blamed on the basis of what he dreamt? Notice, i f  someone were to 
compliment him on his a g ility  .in making his escape a fte r he told his
c -
dream, Peter'could only take these statements as being made in je s t, or 
jokingly; Also, i f  his mother were to blame him for being caught in 
this situation and recommend that he carry a gun, when venturing into
t
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the forest, Peter would probably think these comments were to ta lly
unjustified . No one is praised or blamed.for what they*da,in a dream, t
Although people often take an in terest in dream narratives most of us
just lis ten  to them with an open mind. I t  goes no further than that.
From the grammatical analogies we have examined, i t  appears that
there are s ignificant differences between ordinary narratives and dream
*
narratives: 1 ) that dream narratives d iffe r  with respect to consequences,
2) that'praise and blame do not apply to dream narratives, and 3) that 
there is no trad ition  of verification  associated with accounts of dreams.
How do these analogies assist us in clearing up confusion about the con­
cept of dreaming?
What happens when someone te lls  us a dream? Do we question them 
as to whether they experienced a series of thoughts, images and sensations 
while asleep? Do we cross-examine them and attempt to verify  what they say? 
Not at a l l ;  and this is an important point about the concept of dreaming.
In te llin g  a dream, I am not claiming to have been in these places, and 
observed these events in the same sense I would i f  I were giving an 
account of actual events and experiences that occurred while awake. I f  
I did, i t  would leave me open to demands for proof, attempted amendments 
of my story, a ll of which seem u tte rly  absurd i f  what I give is an account 
of a dream. All I am claiming when I te l l  a dream is that I have had a 
dream, the details of which I find interesting. This is s ignificant.
I maintain, and w ill argue in the following chapter, that any attempt to
assert more than this involves a conceptual absurdity far removed from 
«
the way we normally te ll  our dreams and the attitudes and opinions we
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have about them.
Summary
At the outset of this chapter i t  was stated th at, from a
Wittgenstein!an point of view, a grammatical investigation is a type
of conceptual investigation. In the following chapter we w ill bring the
results of this grammatical kiyestigation to bear on two philosophical
questions associated with dreaming, namely 1) "Am I awake or asleep
and dreaming?" 2) "Are dreams-composed o f, or identical with any kind
of mental phenomenon occurring during sleep?" Let us pause b rie fly  now
and consider what relevance our investigation into the use of the word
"dream" has for philosophy, and how i t  might help us to resolve the d i f f i -
*
culties involved in each of the above two questions.
The question, "Are dreams composed o f, or identical with any 
kind of mental phenomenon occurring durin^Teep?" has been a central 
concern for philosophers since the publication of Malcolm's Dreaming 
and "Dreaming and Scepticism." In this chapter we noticed, that the word 
"dream" has a variety of uses. But that there was no single or univocal 
meaning to be found existing with every occasion in which the word 
"dream" was used. Philosophers and psychologists continue to seek 
answers to the questions, "What is a dream?" "What is  the essence of 
dreaming?" in an e ffo rt to meet the request le f t  in the wake of Malcolnf’ s 
position. However, i f  the word "dream" fa ils  to have a single meaning 
running through a ll of its  uses, doesn't this cast a dim lig h t on any 
attempt to answer or contest Malcolm's theory with a defin ition  of the 
word "dream?" I believe so, and w ill argue in the following chapter
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that there is something fflndamentally wrong with an attempt to provide
« 4
a defin ition of the word '"<Jheam." I w iT f go on to argue that Malcolm's
contention that dreams are not composed o f, or identical with thoughts,
images, any mental phenomenon occurring during sleep, is supported by a
verific a tio n is t bent; with the result that because there has never been
a tradition of verification  associated with dreaming, both Malcolm's theory
and solution to the sceptical problem are untenable.
The sceptical problem has been a source of discomfort to philoso- 
T
phers for a number of centuries. Contemporary sceptics maintain that
although we may think and be able to prove we \re  awake there is always
s ) *
the possib ility  that we arfe asleep and dreaming. A question begs to be
asked here. Do we find the question, "Am I awa\e or asleep and dreaming?"
present in any Of the examples of. ordinary uses of the word "dream" which
I have provided? Not a"t a l l .  Although there is an example in which the
question "Am I dreaming?" appears, (see example 5, p. 41) the use of the
word "dream" is figura tive . That is , the person is not really  wondering
i f  he is awake or asleep.
The fact that we fa il  to find the sceptic's question in any of
the examples I have provided would suggest that the question, "Am I awake
or asleep and dreaming?" belongs to a language-game far removed from
ordinary discourse. A grairmatical investigation reveals that strange
turns of events only give rise to a figurative use of the word "dream,"
at best. Since the sceptic, in asking the question, "Am I awake or
asleep and dreaming?" employs a basic use of the word "dream" (in  which
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a person cannot dream unless he is asleep)yl w ill argue that his use of 
the word "dream" in this question is both illeg itim a te  and unjustified; 
with the result that because the question fa ils^ to  express a meaningful 
p o ss ib ility , i t  should no longer be a concern fo r philosophy.
With these points behind us, le t  us return to the sceptic and 
Malcolm's account of dreams. We w ill see i f  our grammatical investiga­
tion sheds any lig h t on theirepositions and the problems that have plagued 
philosophy with respect to dreaming.
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FOOTNOTES
Chapter IV
"*It is evident that the sceptical question "Am I aWke of 
asleep and dreaming?" fa ils  to find a serious a rticu la tio n \in  any of 
the texts of the ancient and early modern philosophers we hjhve considered. 
However, this question continues to be maintained by scept/cs since 
Descartes' Meditations. For this reason I have decided yS re fer to 
the sceptical question as a "traditional" problem associated with 
dreaming. /
2See pages-7-9, Chapter.I: 19-21, Chaptep^II.
2I am certain that questions pertfltfiffng to the essence of dreams 
were debated before the twentieth century. However, the question- "Are 
dreams comprised o f, or identical with any kind of mental phenomenon 
occuring during sleep?" appears to have its  f i r s t  serious articu lation  
with the evaluation and criticisms that follow after. Malcolm's Dreaming 
(1959). For this reason I have chosen to refer to i t  as a "contemporary" 
problem associated with dreaming. —-
4Norman Malcolm, Dreaming [DJ (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1959), p. 59.
5
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 
[ RPP], 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), #374.
^See pages 32-35, Chapter I I I .
\udw ig  Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [P I]
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, In c ., .1968), #340.
g
Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of'Dreams, ed. James Strachey 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 339-340.
9 *Here I exclude the possib ility  that the professor might be 
te llin g  a l ie .
1 0 Ib id . , p. 184. f
*
^John Hunter, "Some Questions About Dreaming," Mind 80 (1971):
8 2 - 8 3 .
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12W.S. Boardman, "Dreams, Dramas, and Scepticism" Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 6 (December 1976): 226.
13Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 57.
l 4Wittgenste1n, PI_, #90.
^W ittgenstein, PI_, #7.
16O.K. Bouwsma, Philosophical Essays (Lincoln, Nebrasaka: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1965), p. 163.
^ J .T . Price, "Dream Recollection and Wittgenstein's Language" 
Dialogue 13 (1974): 39.
r
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CHAPTER V
A CRITIQUE OF THE SCEPTIC'S QUESTION AND MALCOLM 
IN LIGHT OF THIS GRAMMATICAL INVESTIGATION
Not to explain, but to accept the psychological 
phenomenon - that is what is d if f ic u lt .
[ RPP, #509.]
In the previous chapter our efforts  were 'directed toward a detailed  
investigation of the grammar of the word "dream." We can now bring the 
fru its  of our grammatical investigation to bear on two philosophical 
questions, (1) "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" (2) "Are dreams 
composed o f, or identical with any kind of mental phenomenon occurring 
during sleep?1^  Let us return to the sceptic and Norman Malcolm's account 
of dreams. I w ill examine each position respectively beginning with an 
analysis of the contemporary sceptical question associated with dreaming. 
The chapter concludes with-a critique of Malcolm's account of dreams as 
i t  appears in his book, Dreaming, and in his paper, "Dreaming and 
Sceptici sm."
A. An Examination of the Contemporary Sceptical Question Associated
i ,
with Dreaming
Thus fa r , attempts to contest the sceptical question "Am I awake
*
or asleep and dreaming?" have been unsuccessful. Various philosophers
2have decided to subscribe to a principle of coherence. Others have 
sought refuge in elaborate tests and proofs with which one could establish 
that we are awake. The sceptic refuses to be convinced by any of these.
67 '
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He continues to maintain that you cannot know you are awake, you can 
only believe . i t ;  and this w ill  always leave the possibility that you 
may be asleep and dreaming.^
In Chapter IV, we had occasion to examine and consider a number
t
of examples in which the use of the word "dream" could be found. During 
that examination, our attention was drawn to a striking curiosity: that 
the sceptic's question "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" failed to 
appear in any of the examples I have provided. To begin my considera­
tion of the sceptic's question, le t 's  focus on this curiosity.
I w ill  offer two b r ie f  arguments which provide significant 
reasons for the absence of the sceptical question in everyday discourse. 
They are: (1) that the sceptic's question conceals a sentence "I may be
asleep and dreaming" which, when subjected to analysis, fa ils  to express 
a meaningful possibility for a waking subject; (2) that questions and 
statements such as "Am I dreaming?" and "I must be dreaming" are really  
only the products of a^  momentary confusion and are not indicative of a 
serious doubt about whether one is awake or asleep. I w ill  go on to argue 
that the sceptic has extended the use of the word "dream" beyond the 
bounds of ordinary language, and that'his question "Am I awake or asleep 
and dreaming?" is restricted to a particular language-game, that of 
philosophy. Following this , I w ill  indicate that the sceptic's question 
employs a metaphysical use of the word "dream." Y\f consideration of the
i
grammar of the sceptic's question w ill  conclude with an argument which < 
attempts to show thaT the sceptic's use of the word "dream" is peculiar. 
Because the question is subject to these grammatical errors, I maintain
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tha t i t  should no longer be treated as a meaningful philosophical 
inq u iry .
1 • Ihe_§cegtic^s_Question_Fai1s_to_Express_a_Meanln2fu ] P o s s ib ility  
for_a_Waking_Subject
To begin our treatment o f the. scep tic 's  question, we might note 
tha t beneath its  surface lie s  the sentence " I may be asleep and dreaming." 
I f  we subject th is  sentence to close scru tiny  we w i l l  notice tha t i t  fa i ls
5
to  express a meaningful p o s s ib ility  fo r  a waking sub ject. F irs t ,  i t  
is  necessary to ask, "What is  a meaningful p o s s ib ility ? "  A meaningful 
* p o s s ib ility  is  a 's ta te  o f a ffa irs  which has the power to a ffe c t my
,-----pjcesent s itu a tio n , in  such a way tha t I am ju s t i f ie d  in  l iv in g  my l i f e ,
^  changing my behavior and actions according to  the im plica tions o f th is
p o s s ib ility . C^For example, le t  us suppose tha t I intend to go fish in g  
th is  afternoon. When I looked out the window th is  morning the lake
V
appeared clear and calm. However, since -noon, radio reports have issued 
a storm warning fo r  the area and^have cautioned a l l  but very large c ra ft  
to stay o f f  the lake. Since my boat is  powered by a very small motor,
the p o s s ib ility  o f a thunderstorm th is  afternoon is  a meaningful possi-
.. \
b i l i t y .  That i s , “ the p o s s ib il ity  o f a severe storm coupled w ith the 
radio reports are enough to  keep me from venturing out on the lake.
The consequences th a t loom on the horizon o f th is  p o s s ib ility  ( " I t  w i l l  
thunderstorm today") have the power to a ffe c t my present state o f a ffa irs
~ a
and my in tentions fo r  the rest o f my waking day.
Why then does the sentence "I may be asleep and dreaming" f a i l
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*
to express a meaningful possibility for a waking subject? Consider 
this as an elaboration: At this moment I am seated at a desk in the 
Philosophy Common Room, defending my thesis before a committee of 
three professors and a small audience. Now i t  is obvious to me that 
I am not responding to questions.about my paper with my eyes closed, 
and i t  is with some design and deliberate intent that I listen to their
objections, prepare my answers and respond accordingly. What would
follow i f  I were asleep and dreaming? Isn’ t  this a peculiar possibility  
for a waking subject to entertain?
Notice, a number of absurd consequences would follow i f  I were 
asleep and dreaming while defending my thesis. For one, I would not 
be dressed in slacks and sweater. Since I sleep in pajamas the clothes 
that I am wearing now would be hanging in the closet at home. Let us
say that during-my- defence one of my committee members begins a d i f f i ­
cult l ine  of questioning pertaining to an area of philosophy about which 
I know very l i t t l e .  At once I begin to fa l te r ,  stumbling through a 
number of incomplete answers and my overall performance suffers consider­
ably. I f  I were asleep and dreaming while defending .my thesis i t  would ; 
take l i t t l e  reflection to see that I should have no cause to worry.
Since these questions are only questions in a dream (and my performance 
is but part of a dream) my thesis grade and graduate career would not be 
affected in the least. Finally, i f  I am asleep and dreaming while defend­
ing my thesis the grade that my committee delivers a fte r  deliberating 
must be imaginary since the ir evaluation of my performance is just part 
of a dream.
r
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This example reveals the absurdity of what is involved in the
sentence "I may be asleep and dreaming." The sentence fa i ls  to express
a meaningful possibility  for a waking subject because i t  drags along
a ll  kinds of crazy consequences. I f  i t  were the case that I were asleep
and dreaming while defending nfy thesis i t  would follow that the desk
that I am s itting  at, the reference texts, pens and pencils before me,
my committee and the other members of the audience would a l l  become parts
of a dream. This is to say no matter how serious the objections against
my paper are, however poorly I perform, a ll  of this cannot be considered
in the same sense as i t  would i f  I were defending my thesis during waking
hours. But notice, the senselessness of this sentence "I may be asleep
and dreaming" does not shine through l ike  a lighthouse in a storm. One
has to do a l i t t l e  spadework before realizing the consequences involved
with a remark such as this.
The~~problem with the question “Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?"
is its  subtle peculiarity. The sentence "I may be asleep and dreaming"
stands between us and the sentence "I am awake" because of i ts  ab ili ty
to masquerade as a meaningful possibility . However, i t  is not jus tif ied
in doing so. I f  i t  were possible that I am asleep and dreaming while
defending this thesis I would have a substantial reason to doubt the
»
'statement "I am awake." But l i f e  as I know i t  affords me no occasion to 
doubt that I'm awake during waking hours, since the possibility  that I 
may be asleep and dreaming while defending tftis thesis is too insub­
stantial to father anything but pretend doubts. .
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Qy?^i9!25_3D^-§5?^§!r§D55_§“5!]_6s_"^111_I Dreaming?", "I Must Be 
!?n§9!I)iD9 "_At2_2 2 £_l2di^atiye_of_a_Seri ous Doubt About Whether one
In Chapter IV I argued that a serious doubt about whether one is 
awake or asleep and dreaming fa i ls  to appear in any of the examples in 
which the use of .the..word-"dream" can be found. There is an objection 
waiting in the wings and I would like  tojdeal with i t  now. The objection, 
made'by the sceptic, can be put in 'the following way: "You say that a 
serious doubt about whether I am awake or asleep and dreaming fa i ls  ^o 
appear in any of these examples. Haven't you been dogmatic? Perhaps i t ' s  
just that your imagination has its  lim its . There are cases where a person, 
can genuinely wonder whether he- is awake or asleep."-^
Would the following be the sort of example our cri : has in mind? 
Recently, the country of Poland came under martial law. The decision that
l ig h t ,  the situation in certain c it ie s ' in  Poland changed radically in the 
space of some twelve hours. Put yourself in ‘ttuT'-place of an everyday
soliders, armed with guns, marching in step .down the street. As your . 
eyes scan the roadway you notice tanks and trucks following close behind.
You say, "I must be dreaming": pinch yourself and then ask: "Am I dreaming
* ■< 
the military force move in and take, arms happened overnight. In this
resident liv ing alone in the city of Gdansk. Sitting at the breakfast 
table you hear a great commotion outside. There'are the sounds of 
.machines, clinking and clanging, and.people shouting in anger and 
desperation. Pulling the curtain aside, you see hundreds of uniformed
/
4
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j
The scep tic , in presenting th is  example claims to have provided 
a leg itim ate  case in d ica tive  o f a serious doubt about whether one is  
awake,'or asleep and dreaming. Does th is  objection a ffec t- the 'p o s itio n  
advanced in  th is  thesis- thus far? I do not see how i t  could. I t  is  
easy to see th a t th is  s itu a tio n  could give r ise  to a question such as 
"Am I dreaming?" or a statement such " I must be dreaming." Nevertheless, 
/ I  would maintain tha t in  l ig h t  o f our discussion o f the grammar o f the 
. word "dream," (Chapter IV) such expressions would only be^  f ig u ra tiv e , 
metaphorical uses a t best; Consider what causes our Polish friend  to 
-make these statements. -
Let us suppose tha t p o lit ic s  in  Roland have been at a l u l l ,  
l .Perhaps there has been no sign o f p o lit ic a l unrest in  th e c i ty ,  absolutely
no ind ica tion  the army was massing fo r  a march or prepared to enforce 
m artia l law. Suddenly, w ith in  the space o f twelve hours, m artia l law had 
been imposed. When- our man .in Gdansk looks out the window a t the scene 
in the streets below, he takes in  a whole new barrage o f events; another 
* world p ic tu re  i f  you w i l l .  Since very few o f these a c t iv it ie s  jib e  w ith
the p o lit ic a l atmosphere:-o f the c ity  he's thrown f o r e  momentary loop,-
ba ffled  and overawed at what is  faking place before him.
,. ‘ •
. Could":we say, as the sceptic wants to  cla im , tha t he is sincere ly
> ‘ , . .
' i  doubting whether he is  awake or asleep and-dreaming? . I db not th ink so.
Here we need to  distinguish- between a doubt and a momentary confusion.
I f r the sceptic wants to claim tha£ the c it iz e n 's  question "Am I .dreaming?"
o # • *
is  in d ica tive  o f a genuine do u b t,y it would fo llow  tha t our man in Gdansk'
* *
,would not be able to resolve his.problem w ithout something to a ffo rd
«»
»
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assurance of the certainty that he was awake. The fact that he has 
pinched himself is not enough to establish, with certainty, that he is- 
awake since the sceptic w i l l  argue that i t  is always possible that he is 
only pinching himself in a dream. In Chapter I we noticed that Descartes 
did not arrive at a principle with which he could distinguish waking
i
l i f e  from sleep until the Sixth Meditation. Not taking too many l ib e r t ie s ,
I think i t  is safe to assume that the dream problem kept Descartes^busy 
\ 4
for some time, perhaps a few hours—perhaps a few days.
Would we expect the fellow in the Gdansk example to continue 
asking his question? That is ,  would he entertain a genuine doubt about 
whether he was awake or asleep and dreaming say, until the following day?
We must not be naive. The resident who lookb out his window at the 
scene in the street in Gdansk is b a f f le d ^  Tanks, jeeps, and uniformed 1
soldiers are not common fare on this particular street. And, because these
7
events are off the beaten track, they create a surprise. I t  is this 
radical sh ift  in scenery that causes Our man in Gdansk to make the state­
ments and ask the questions he does.
Questions and statements such as "Am I-dreaming?", "I must be 
dreaming," are really only the products of a momentary confusion. They 
are not indicative of a serious doubt about whether one is awake or 
asleep. I t  would be strange indeed i f  we .thought .our man in Gdansk was 
- actually doubting whether he was awake or asleep. His puzzlement at the 
- ac t iv ity  outside his window would last pefTtaps a couple of seconds. I t
would take no time at a l l  before this momentary confusion disappeared.
To imagine that he performed an elaborate r itual to relieve his confusion
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seems wrong. The move from confusion to the realization that he*was 
awake would be next to instantaneous. You would not find our Polish 
resident rushing down the stairs to the mail box, search!ng‘ for a news-
v t
paper whose headline would confirm that he was awake, i .e .  "MARTIAL LAW 
DECLARED!" Again, to say that he wouldyapproach the people on the street 
for information as to whether he was awake and not asleep and dreaming 
seems equally prepostehous. The resolution of the problem does not 
seem to require that kind of e ffo r t .
3. I!}f_§ceptic_Has_Extencfed_The_Use_of_The_Word_"Dr^|m"_Beyond_The 
?2yo2§_2f_9ndinary_Discourse
What do I mean when I say that the use of the word "dreato" that
is employed by the scepti^ is  extended past the bounds of normal lingusd^ic
usage? We have seen that the word "dream" is used in d ifferent ways, and
in a host of contexts. However, the uses of the word "dream" appear to
fa l l  into two distinct categories: (1) the basic sense of the word, in
which a person cannot be said to be "dreaming" unless he is asleep, (2)
figurative, metaphorical uses where the sense of the word ^dream" is
used to say "I'm mistaken, confused" and so on. )
I f  we look back at the .host of examples in Chapter IV we should
•take care to notice that puVklement and confusion rest with figurative uses \
of the word "dream." When the word "dream" is used in its  basic sense,
— -  *
J  most people speak with a good deal of confidence. ->That is ,  they te l l  
their dreams, talk about them, interpret them and make qualitative and 
quantitative judgements about them without ever suggesting tihat they'
i
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fa i l  to be able to distinguish waking l i f e  from sleep. What is interest­
ing is that on no occasion excepting the sceptic's use (a metaphysical 
use) does a doubt about whether one is awake or asleep and dreaming 
creep in when a basic use of the word "dream" is being employed. Since 
the scepti^ asks his question as a genuine question (which involves the 
basic sense of the word "dream" and accordingly a serious doubt about 
whether we are awake or asleep and dreaming) i t  confirms that he has 
extended the use of the word past the bounds of normal linguistic  
discourse.
L
4. The Sceptic^Question Belongs^to the Language-Game of Philosophy 
and_Involves_A_Metaghysi caI_U9e of_the Word_"Dream"
— "^e examPles provided in Chapter IV were formulated and selected 
with careful attention to the way we would normally use the word "dream." 
Since the sceptic's question, "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" is 
absent from these examples, i t  suggests that the question may belong 
to a language-game far removed from our normal, day-to-day linguistic  
exchange. In line with Wittgenstein's counsel, we would do well to ask: 
"To what language-game does this question belong?"
In a paper entitled "The Availability^of Wittgenstein's Later 
Philosophy" Stanley Cavell te l ls  us that:
" I f ,  in the nonscientific (skeptical) conflict with 
common be lie f,  words are in some vtay deprived of 
the ir  normal functioning, a concepti&Tization of this 
distortion w ill  have to account for this pair of facts: 
that the philosopher's words must (or must seem to) be 
used in the ir normal way, otherwise they would not con­
f l i c t  with what should ordinarily be meant in using them;
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and that the philosopher's words cannot be used in 
(quite) th e ir  normal way, otherwise the ordinary 
facts, examples, and considerations he adduces 
would not y ie ld  a general skeptical conclusion.
y lt  is such a pair of facts, I suggest, that 
•yWittgenstein is responding to when he says of 
philosophical (he calls them "metaphysical") expressions 
that (roughly) they are "used apart from their normal 
language game,1'' that their "grammar is misunderstood," 
that they "flout the common c r ite r ia  used in connection 
with these expressions." 8
. \
According to Cavell, (and Wittgenstein) a word Is  used "metaphysically"
4
i f  i t  is articulated during a discussion of a subject or problem far
removed from normal considerations and ordinary discourse. In that the
sceptic's challenge involves an epistemological problem that fa ils  to
appear .in ordinary language i t  is entirely possible that the sceptic's
question involves a metaphysical use of the word "dream."
I t  is rare "tffat anyone would ask a question such as "Am I awake,
or asleep and dreaming?" of themselves or any other--except perhaps is
special circumstances. In the Meditations Descartes was concerned with
establishing the basis of philosophy, 'attempting to arrive at a funda-
V /  •mental certainty from which a ll philosophizing could begin.- However,
 ^ very few people engage in this kind of serious metaphysics while speaking
a language. In this respect, Wittgenstein's advice to philosophers at
PI_#116, is revealing: %> .
When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being",
’ "object", " I" ,  "proposition", "name",'- and try to 
grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask 
onself: is the word ever actually used in this way
in the language-game which is its  original home?--
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical 
to their everyday use. [PI_, #116.]
X -
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P
I f  the sceptic's employment of the word "dreaming" is a "metaphysical 
use" and his question is restricted to the language-game of philosophy 
i t  would follow that the possibility of our being exposed to both the 
use and the question is severely hampered (as i t  would not i f  i t  were 
part of our normal l inguistic  discourse). ^
As we make our way through l i f e  i t  is not uncommon that we are 
exposed to new and d ifferent uses of words. For example, le t  us say that 
before entering uliiversity I have had v irtua lly  no exposure to the dis­
cipline of philosophy. During my f i r s t  year I decide to enroll in an 
introductory philosophy course. The assignment for the f i r s t  month of
studies involves an in depth examination of the arguments in Norman
Malcolm's book, Dreaming. Preparing for class one afternoon I am struck *
by a most interesting passage:
The anciently perplexing question 'How can I te l l  
whether I am awake or dreaming?' seems to me to obtain 
its force from two errors. One is that of^supposing 
that dreaming and waking might be 'exact counterparts',
this being an error that comes from confusing the
historical and dream-telling senses of f i r s t  person 
singular psychological sentences in the past tense.
The other is that of thinking that one must be able to 
know>^ tcr'see^ that one. is awake. We are thus brought 
to a( state of'paralysis, caught as i t  were in the grip 
of contradiction. We think we^nust know th is , yet we 
realize that we could not. I have tr ied  to expose 
both errors. [D, p. 120.] "1
There is something about the gpestion Malcolm cites in the f i r s t  
sentence of'th is  passage that continues to puzzle me. The d i f f ic u l t
thing is to determine why. What I want to leave open as a possibility
for us to consider is this. At the point that I entfer into the discipline 
of philosophy I w ill  be exposed to new and different uses of words.
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I may have had exposure to a number of Gses of a particular word such 
as "<freaming" (basic uses, figurative uses) and know how to apply i t  
comfortably. However, while reading texts such as Malcolm's Dreaming 
and Descartes' Meditations I w ill  encounter what Wittgenstein referred 
to as a "metaphysical" use of the word "dream." 0
I f  I have never been exposed to this "metaphysical" use of the
word "dreaming" (or better s t i l l ,  seen i t  employed in just this way) I
«
w ill  be thrown for a momentary loop. This is not to say that I w i l l  never 
be able to understand how the word is being used in the sceptic's 
question. I t  is just that he has extended the use of the word in such a 
way that is unfamiliar-to me--and in this respect, puzzling. I am 
suggestjmg that this is the case with the sceptical question associated 
with dreaming.
*' *
5. The_Scegtic's yse_of_.the_Word_"Dream"_is_Illegitimate_and_Unjustified
How then is the sceptic ju s tif ied  in asking this question?' Is
his use of the word "dreaming" in the question, "Am I awake or asleep and
dreaming?" a legitimate use of the word? That the scepticSs use of the\ ^
word "dream" is peculiar can be seen from the following obsetwatp-eff! ■— — 
We could say that the basic sense of the word- "dream" keeps .a certain
i
company with other words in our language. In this respect the word
"sleep" is a prime example, i . e .  where-one would necessarily be under­
stood to have been asleep while "dreaming" in this sense. In the course 
of learning a language we become fam iliar with these words and phrcfses
g
in such a way that our concept of the word "dream" begins to be defined.,
'  *
6
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That is ,  when someone says, "I had a dream" (uses the word "dream" in 
a sentence with ju s t  these words), we expect him to go on to f i l l  in the
details of his dream in the form of a narrative. This is because we have
become comfortable with a number of words and phrases and the company they
keep with this particular use of the word.
When the sceptic asks "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" we 
are puzzled by the question, perhaps because the words "Am I awake" are 
not part of the common company of the word "dreaming." That is ,  the 
word "awake," when juxtaposed with the words "asleep" and "dreaming" 
seems peculiar because the words, and accordingly the concepts "awake" 
and "asleep dfrtS^reaming," are never placed at odds with one another in ^  
ordinary language. I am suggesting that when the sceptic asks the
question "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" he brings words and 
phrases to bear on*the basic use of the word "dream" in a new and different  
way. In doing so, the sceptic creates confusion about the use of the
word "dream." I t  is for this reason I maintain that his use of the word 
"dreaming" is i l l  ' d%e.
In what other way is the sceptic's extension of ttie use of the 
word "dream" peculiar? The question "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" 
suggests that we htKlonger know how to apply these woWs in the ir  proper 
context. I argue that the sceptic's use of the word "dreaming" in his 
question is unjustified for just this reason. There is a sense in which 
the word "dreaming" would not make an unusual f i t  with the word "awake." 
Thar is ,  the sense we find .in "daydreaming," a fantasy or brand of mental 
stage setting one might engage in-during waking hours.' A l i t t l e
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reflection w il l  te l l  us that we often use the word "dreaming" in this 
way. But in no case do we use the word "dreaming" to suggest the 
possibility that one could.be dreaming, in the basic sense of the word, 
while awake.
The peculiar thing about the sceptic's use of the word "dreaming"
is that he employs i t  in a question that is posed as a/genuine question.
That is to say  ^ by juxtaposing the use of thKi^opdfciwake" and "asleep
and dreaming," the sceptic suggests the possibility that,we can and do
confuse-the use of the words "dreaming" and "awake." Our grammatical
A
investigation has revealed that nothing could be further from the truth.
I have argued then, for this reason that his extension of the use of 
the word "dream" in this particular question, "Am I awake or asleep and 
dreaming?" is 'unjustified. On the basis of the arguments I jjave provided, 
and because the sceptic's question is subject to these grammatical errors, 
H I propose that the question, "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" should 
not continue to be treated as a meaningful inquiry for philosophy.
B. A Critique of Malcolm's Position on Dreaming ^
V
Norman Malcolm's Dreaming and "Dreaming ans Scepticism" are 
important contributions to philosophical l i tera ture  in that they too 
attempt to show that the sceptica'Tqiestion associated with dreaming is 
unjustified. - In  attempting to meet the sceptical question Malcolm argues, 
that sleep has no experiential content.^  But in doing so Malcolm raises 
another question; "Are dreams composed of, or identical with any kind of
/
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mental phenomenon occurring during sleep?" I t  is Malcolm's contention 
that dreams are not composed 'o f, or identical with thoughts, images, 
sensations or conscious experiences of any kind, r w il l  begin with two 
brief criticisms of Malcolm's position and then subject his position to 
a number of considerations which came out of our grammatical investiga­
tion in the previous chapter.
Following this I w ill  argue that from a Wittgensteinian perspec­
tive , Malcolm's treatment of mental phenomena during sleep is far too 
restric tive . Furthermore, I maintain that i f  his argument against 
scepticism is based on this treatment of mental phenomena-during sleep 
i t  is not strong enough to undercut the sceptic's position. I w il l  go 
on to argue that Malcolm's treatment of dreaming commits him to a position 
that is in some degree of tension with recent advances.in science and 
psychology. ^_Finally, I w ill  argue that his position involves a move away 
from ordinary language, the questions, statements and conventions that 
comprise our concept of dreaming. I f  we can show with success that his 
position is l e f t  with too many unhappy results a case can begin to be 
made for our grammatical investigation; as a more plausible alternative  
for dealing with philosophical problems associated with dreams. Our 
critique w il l  conclude by evaluating: (1,) Malcolm's treatment of "sound
i .
asleep" (2) Malcolm's application of the word "criterion."
I would l ike  to begin my.critique by focussing on what I feel to 
be two weak points in Malcolm's position on dreams. While i t  is not my
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intention to elucidate these objections in any d e ta il ,  they are important 
because they reveal that his position is not as defensible as i t  f i r s t  
might seem. The f i r s t  d i f f ic u lty  at the heart of Malcolm's position is 
that i t  cannot accommodate any other phenomena associated with sleep 
without d i f f ic u l ty .  This is evident.if  we review a number of statements
fJ
central to his position and consider them in l ig h t of his treatment of
nightmares.^
V. According to Malcolm the c r ite r ia  of someone's being sound asleep
are that his eyes are closed, his body inert', his breathing rhythmical
/■
12and that he is unresponsive to stimuli of moderate intensity. Further
Malcolm contends that dreams are not composed of, or identical with
thoughts, images, sensations (mental phenomena of any kind) because
13sleep cannot have any content of experience. I maintain that his posi­
tion is restric tive  for the following reason.
Let us suppose that we are of the opinion that dreaming is a 
mental phenomenon which occurs during sleep. What is unusual about 
Malcolm's position is that i f  a^leeping subject fa ils  to satisfy any of
the c r ite r ia  cited above, Malcolm refuses to consider this person as being
"asleep." Malcolm, in "Dreaming and Scepticism" te l ls  us that a thought, 
feeling or sensation which is unexpressed during waking hours, but finds 
expression in a speaker's testimony at a later date, legitimately 
establishes tjie occurrence of that mental event. What is unusual is
4
that while he credits the la ter testimony of a person who 1 a
while these thoughts occurred, he refuses to allow i t  in the case\of a 
person who claims to have had mental activ ity  during sleep:
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Whereas i t  is false that a man who is sound asleep 
could, while he is sound asleep, give any signs or 
indications that a certain thought was occurring to 
him or that he was experiencing some sensation. For 
any sign of this would also be a sign that he was
at least partly awake. [ U & S, pp. 116-117.]
I t  may be thought that we could appeal to the sleeper's
testimony after he awakened___  I f  we have no way of
establishing that he knows how to use the sentence 
other than by appeal to his testimony, then we cannot 
appeal to his testimony. [D, p. 11.]
In denying the occurrence of mental activ ity  during sleep Malcolm
also claims that while a a waking subject did not express the thought,
feeling or sensation at the time he COULD HAVE, whereas this is impossible.
14for a sleeping subject. This attitude has its  problems for Malcolm when 
he offers some remarks about nightmares. For we could imagine a case 
where indirect evidence would lead us to suppose that sleeping subjects 
do have mental phenomena during sleep. I am staying overnight at your 
residence room; you re tire  to bed while I stay up to finish' a ^erm paper.
A l i t t l e  a fte r  one o'clock you begin to thrash about in your bed. Ten . 
minutes la ter you wake up and relate the details of a dream which you prefer 
to call a "nightmare."
The behavior of this sleeping s.ubject seems to suggest that he did 
experience mental phenomena during sleep. The fact is that we often use 
the word "nightmare" in this way and there would be no question as to-
whether this person was asleep when this happened. S t i l l ,  on Malcolm's
/
account a person who showed signs of experiencing some kind of mental
phenomena would not be asleep, he would be partly awake:.
Nor would a man who was tossing about, crying out and. 
groaning in the throes of a nightmare be a good example
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of a person asleep. To say that someone having 
a violent nightmare is 'asleep', is to make a natural 
extension of the use of that word beyond its primary 
use. []D, p. 28.]
This is indeed a most puzzling position.
If we consider the way we use the word "nightmare" we notice
that Malcolm has been too- restric tive  with this view. A l i t t l e  reflection
w ill  te lTus  that we use the word "nightmare" to describe a disturbing
dream during sleep., A nightmare may be a b it  more dramatic in character,
more frightening in nattire but i t  is a "dream" just the same. On Malcolm's
account a person that fa'ils to satisfy a ll  the c r ite r ia  of "sleep" is no
longer dreaming--he is partly awake. However, there are d ifferent kinds
of dreams in which the behavior of the sleeping subject does suggest the
possibility of the occurrence of mental phenomena during sleep. Since
Malcolm's position runs into problems in this respect, i t  is evident
that he has limited his consideration of sleep in such a way that his
position cannot easily accommodate these other phenomena (nightmares,
sleepwalking) of sleeping subjects.
Ify second criticism of Malcolm's position concerns an inconsistency
that is extremely damaging to his position that dreams are not conscious
15experiences. Malcolm equates sleep witb^being unconscious. For this
reason Malcolm argues that a dream cannot be composed o f ,  or identical
with, any kind of mental phenomena or conscious experience:
The description would have to be of some conscious 
experience. But having some conscious experience or 
other, no matter what, is not what is meant by being 
as]eep. [D . , p. 12.]
1
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Consequently the philosophical claim, 'When people • 
dream they are aware of the ir dreams'(or: 'Dreams 
are conscious experiences'), says absolutely nothing.
[D, p. 59.]
What is puzzling .and inconsistent with his view that dreams are not
/  ' ’
\  conscious experiences is that Malcolm also wants to say that a dream
» *  , • • .
has cohtent: ^
I f  someone te l ls  a^dream we do not 'think of doubting 
i ts  occurrence on the ground that his sleep was".
. gf thoroughly quiet and relaxed. In this sense of
'dream' a dream has content..., which is described 
when the dream is related. [D, p. 63.]
I f  we compare Mal.colm's two claims,(1) - Dreams are not conscious 
experiences and (£•) Dreams have content, i t  is clear that his. position' 
begins to have its  problems. For i f  a dream is no.t composed of, or
identical with any conscious experience" but yet has "content," we are
le f t  in a muddle as to what*this "content" consists of. I f  itj^annot 
be included in the l i s t  of mental phenomena Malcolm cites (thoughts, 
-images, sensations, impressions), ofcomposed of a conscious experience 
of any kind i t  seems odd to suggest that a dream has content--and then
j .  • • - • ’ 1 6
refuse to offer the reader an explanation of what this content entials. 
This question pertaining to content finds no clear resolution with- 
Malcolm's account of dreaming. Yet i f  dreams occur during sleep and a 
dream has content (which Malcolm is prepared to admit) i t  would fol'low 
that what is fundamental to his position (sleep has no experiential 
content, dreams are nqt conscious experiences) could be called into 
question. For i f  Malcolm wants to have i t  that,sleep has no experiential 
coijtent, but that a dream does have content (ifi some sense) he s t i l l  owes 
D us an explanation of what he takes the "content" of a dream' to bet As a
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result of this unusual statement ("Dreams have content") i t  is my 
opinion that Malcolm’ s position that "dreams are not conscious experi­
ences" is subject to criticism.
2. Malcolm and the "Dream-Distinction"
We w ill  now bring the grammatical considerations of Chapter IV
' to bear on Malcolm's position on dreams. The question, "Are dreams com-
■ posed of, or identical with any kind of mental phenomenon during sleep?" 
continues to be a^primary concern for philosophers.' In Chapter IV we 
noticed that the word "dream" has a variety of uses;" but that there was
no single or univocal meaning to be found with every occasion in which
the word "dream" was jjsepf. Malcolm is reluctant to define what a dream 
is or provide a definition of dreaming. He says: "I am not trying to
1 ftsay what dreaming is: I do not understand what i t  would mean to do that."
The d i f f ic u l t  thing is to see how Malcolnj^s^justified in arguing that -
dreams are none of the things that philosophers have commonly supposed
✓
them to be. Philosophers continue to seek answers to the questions, "What
is a dream?" "What is the essence of dreaming?"'in an e ffo rt to meet th§ )
19request le f t  in -the wake of Malcolm's position. In light of our dis­
cussion of grammar in Chapter IV I maintain that there is something funda- ■ 
mentally wrong with these attempts to provide an essential definition of 
the word "dream." I w ill  also argue that Malcolm's position is a product 
of a mistake in argumentation, in which he overlooks a fundamental distinc­
tion articulated in the previous chapter.
v
i
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In Chapter IV we gave consideration to a distinction that I
— 20thought necessary to introduce, i . e .  the "dream-rdistinction."
This distinction was brought forward to show the reader that when 
■people te l l  their dreams they do not wish the ir account to be ^aken * 
in the sense as they would i f  they were giving an account of events 
that took place while they were awake. That .the distinction is under­
stood by the person te ll ing  the dream can be seen by his use of the
phrase "I dreamt" or other similar' locutions, "Last night I had a dream" 
"I had a dream in which" at the beginning of the narrative.
Is there anything which would lead us to suppose that a group o f
listeners would be confused or at a loss to understand what is being 
* said when someone te lls  a dream? That people understand the significance 
of the phrase "I dreamt" is evident in the attitude they take toward 
dream narratives. People who are familiar with the concept of dreaming 
who have had dreams and told them to others have acquaintance-with the 
language-game of dream-telling. When someone begins a narrative with
•v
the phrase "I dreamt," the reaction people have toward i t  may appear 
similar to the attitude one adopts while listening to a normal account 
of events--but there is much about i t  that is different.
During our discuss'ion' of the grammar of the word "dream" we 
considered a number of analogies that exist between dream narratives and 
J normal accounts. I t  was shown that while the statements in a dream 
narrative bear a strong surface sim ilarity  to statements made in normal 
accounts, there are significant differences to be found existing between 
them: that praise and blame do not apply to dream narratives; that there
/
#  6
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is no tradition of verification associated wi'th accounts of dreams;
✓that dream-telling statements d if fe r  with' inspect to consequences.
When a person begins a narrative with the phrase, "I dreamt"
3
those within earshot understand that there is a difference in the way
the speaker is using the words in his narrative and the way in which he
wants them to be understood. Why then would anyone in te l l in g  a dream,
or discussing the phenomenon of dreaming, want to claim that we reason,
judge, imagine etc. and have experiences in the same sense that people do
them and have them when awake? According to Norman Malcolm, people do
make this kind of claim:
The d if f ic u lty  for my thesis is the following.
Suppose someone relates a dream in which, s'ay, 
he was very frightened of horses. He sTiows a 
persisting fear of horses throughout the day and 
says i t  is the same feeling he had in his dream.
Should we not take this testimony as establishing 
that he had a certain feeling when asleep in the 
same sense that he now has i t  when awake? I f  so, 
sleep can have a genuine 'content of experience1.
[D, p. 91.]
What's more,'Maicolm states that psychologists and various notable
philosophers subscribe to the opinion that we reason, judge and have
21sense impressions in the same sense as we do when awake. I t  is precisely 
this view, that one can reason, judge in the same sense that one can have 
these experiences while awake, that Malcolm attempts to contest.
Malcolm believes that where these other philosophers and psychol­
ogists go wrong is in thinking that we do reason, think, etc. during 
sleep in the same sense as we do when awake. The f i r s t  p i t fa l l  with 
holding an opinion.that we can reason, judge in the same sense during
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manneryof comparing dreaming and waking inevitably results in the
skeptical question: '.How can I t e l l  whether at this moment I am awake
22or asleep?' and in the skeptical conclusion: ‘ I cannot t e l l . ” ' As 
vtell, i f  we allow that we do reason, judge, during sleep in the same 
sense we do while awake the principle of coherence fa ils  as a refutation  
of scepticism. This is bfecause the principle of coherence is based on 
the same absurd notion, i .e .  that one is able to te l l  that one is 
dpeaming while asleep.
Malcolm makes much of this error, saddling philosophers Ayer,
tt
RuSseTl, K^nt, Descartes, Aristotle and Plato, psychologists Dement and
Kleitman.and the English-speaking public with i t  at numerous places in
23, vboth Dreaming and “Dreaming and Scepticism." However, is Malcolm
s.
'correct in saying, as he does, that these philosophers, psychologists 
■ and language-users can be held responsible for making this kind of error? 
That.is, do these philosophers -in their treatment and refutation of the 
sceptical problem make the claim that we reason judge i_n the same sense 
as we do when awake? Do scientists, psychologists in their investigation 
of sl'eep and dreams work under the assumption that we have experiences 
. in the same sense while asleep as we do while awake? Finally, do people, 
familiar with the language and concept of dreaming imply that we do 
reason, judge, in the same sense while dreaming when they awake and te l l  
their dreams? I do not see how this could be so.
Perhaps the most important philosopher to be considered here is 
Descartes. The sceptical nroblem associated with dreaming is treated with
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specific reference to.Descartes and Malcolm's references to'the "error" 
mentioned above are made largely with Descartes in mind. Yet, to say, 
as Malcolm does that Descartes makes the claim that in dreams we reason, 
think, have sensations in the same sense we do while awake is not clear 
at a l l .
During the First Meditation, Descartes entertains the possibility  
that he'-might not be seated in front of the hearth, but asleep in his
\
bed. He says, "But I am speaking as though I never- recall having been
misled, while asleep; %  similar illusions Descartes^ use of the .
word "illusions" here deserves attention. We could say that the word
"illusions" embraces for Descartes a ll the mental phenomena he believes
can occur in sleep as in his waking hours, i .e .  thoughts, imaginings,
feelings, sensations and so. on. Notice- though, WTat i f  a l l  of these
activ ities  during sleep are "illusions" then/Descartes cannot-be making
the claim that we think ,t judge, reason, etc. Wrd.ng sleep in the same
sense we do while awake. By calling these mental phenomena "illusions,"
Descartes is making the "drearo-distinction,''’ drawing a sharp line between
what is real and what is dreamt. Therefore tiiere is no reason to suppose,-
as Malcolm does, that Descartes wants*his statement to be taken as a _
claim that we have these experiences in the same sense. Because Descartes
is aware of the "dream-distinotion" it-would appear that t^alcolm has
attributed more to the Cartesian position than is evident in the text of
the Meditations. For this reason, I argue that Malcolm has l i t t l e  ju s t i -
*
fication in claiming Descartes is responsible for an error in this respect.
t
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What about psychologists' and s c ie n tis ts  concerned w ith  the
physiological c r ite r ia  for the opinion that people do dream while asleep,
Many philosophers and psychologists ve thought 
that when one dreams one reasons, judges, imagines, 
has sense^impressions, and so on, while" asleep.
They have thought that to dream is to do those acts 
or have those experiences in the same sense that 
people do them or have them when awake. There may 
ue differences in degree of c la r i ty ,  intensity or 
coherence, but that is a l l .  [D_, p.
However, i f  these philosophers and psychologists maintain (along with 
the cl>aijji that we enjoy mental activ ities  during sleep) that there are 
differences in degree of c la r i ty ,  intensity and coherence of experience, 
then this is not indicative of a claim that we do them or have them in
the same sense at a l1.
Do people, familiar with the language-game of te l l in g  dreams.
c that they think, reason and judge while asleep in the same sense as 
they do while awake? I f  we step back from doing philosophy for a moment 
a question such as this is very unusual. These questions do not get 
asked in the^normal give and take of people listening and te l l in g  their  
dreams. At #309 of the PI_ Wittgenstein asks:
.For some time I "have f e l t  that Malcolm's position is reminiscent of this
investigation of sleep and dreams? In their efforts to propose new
are they’ making .the claim that we think, reason, make judgements etc. 
during sleep in the same sense as we do when awake? Again, Malcolm has 
d if f ic u lty  pleading^his case. He te lls  use
\
Wh$t is your aim in philosophy? - To shew the f ly  
the way out of the f ly -b o tt le .  .
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situation Wittgenstein refers to. In order to provide a conclusive 
refutation of scepticism with respect to dreaming Malcolm decided to- 
propose that dreams are not composed of, or identical with, any kind of 
mental phenomena occurring during sleep. However, because we don't te l l  
our dreams' and discuss-the phenomenon of dreaming in such a way that
• -  v# *
suggests we claim to have had these experiences in the same sense as-our
waking l i f e ,  i t  would seem that Malcolm is the victim of confusion (the 
f ly  trapped in the f ly -b o tt le )-n o t us. I believe that i f  Malcolm had 
kept in mind the "dream-distinction" articulated in Chapter IV he would 
have realized that no one, in te l l in g  a dream or talking abouf one, makes 
that' kind of claim.
In his paper "Dreaming and Scepticism", Malcolm te lls  us that:
When a person is sound asleep he cahnot have any 
sensations, thoughts and feelings at a l l ;  sound 
sleep cannot, in this sense, have any "content of 
experience." [ D & S, p. 114.]
Because "sound sleep" cannot have any content of experience, Malcolm is
confident that he has given us a substantial argument which can be used
to destroy the foundation of the sceptical position associated with
dreaming:
A consequence of my argument is that there is no room 
. for the skeptical question (a) "How can I .know whether 
I am awake or sound asleep" - for the question is 
absurd, since i f  I raise i t  I am not sound asleep.
[ D & S, p. 121.]
In Malcolm ju s tif ied  in using the phrase "sound asleep" as a
tool to dismantle the sceptic's position? I do not think so. In this
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respect i t  ts useful to take a good look at what Malcolm means by "sound
asleep." . I w ill  maintain that Malcolm's use of the word "sound asleep"
cannot be used to destroy the sceptical position associated with dreaming.
Malcolm points out that the phrase "dead to the world" is synonymous
25with the phrase "sound asleep." This seems acceptable. I f  my roommate
* .
is lying on the bed, very s t i l l ,  with his eyes closed and is to ta lly  
oblivious to the conversation going on'around him and the vacuum-cleaner 
screaming in the-hallway, i t  is safe to say, "He's dead to the world." 
However, is i t  right to say, as- Malcolm does that a person, when sound
pc
asleep cannot have any sensations, thoughts or feelings at all? 1 think 
that Malcolm is too restrictive with his use of the phrase "sound asleep" 
in this case.
Suppose that last night I sat up and watched my roommate while 
he slept. During the night I noted that his eyes were closed, his breath­
ing rhythmical and he was unresponsive to the residence caretaker who 
roamed up and down the hall with an electric  sweeper a ll  night. In the 
morning, my roommate woke up and related a dream in which he said his 
girlfriend, had le f t  him for another man. As much as he tr ied  to te l l  
her he loved her she refused to listen to him. Just before he woke up, 
he remembered having an uneasy feeling. He doubted i f  he would ever see 
her again. My roommate said this dream seemed like a very real experience 
at the-time. .
We must be careful of the sense in which Malcolm is asserting 
that " i f  a person is in any state of consciousness i t  logically follows
a 27what he is not sound asleep." . The example which I've provided seems 
to suggest the opposite, namely that we do have mental activ ity  while
4
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sound asleep. Malcolm has given the reader a tailored definition of 
"sound asleep." That is", Malcolm has defined "sound asleep" in such a 
restric tive  way'that i t  is impossible for a sound sleeping subject to 
experience anything at a l l .
I do not think Malcolm had his eye on the way we use the phrase 
"sound asleep" when he defines i t  as he does.in "Dreaming and Scepticism." 
Notice, Malcolm is correct in asserting thJ^Fwe use the phrase "sound 
asleep" in our; language to describe a person who is unresponsive to ex­
ternal stimuli. That is, i f  someone were to enter the roopi while I'm 
observing my roommate and ask "How's he. doing?" I would say "He is sound 
asleep." This, is how people use the phrase "sound asleep." However, we 
,do.not use the phrase "sound asleep" (a la'Malcolm) to-say "At this point 
in time a sleeping subject cannot have any feelings, sensations or thoughts 
of any kind at a l l . "  When people use the phrase "sound asleep" they do 
not use i t  in such a way to exclude the possibility of having mental
phenomena during sleep. I f  they did, we would never be able to make
/  * * *y*
sense of what a person was saying when he wakes up .and te lls  a dream.
>1
In order to provide a conclusive refutation of the sceptic's 
, position Malcolm attempts to maintain a definition of "sound asleep" that 
is too s t r ic t .  His definition of "sound asleep" is only v a l i d i f  we 
l im it  ourselves to the claim that a sleeping subject-Is unresponsive 
to external stimuli. His definition in no way indicates that a body 
that is physically inert and unresponsive to external stimuli cannot have 
"mental phenomena during sleep. Because Malcolm adopts such a restrictive  
position with respect to the phrase "sound asleep," I believe his use of
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the phrase does not ju s tify  his argument against the sceptic's position.
■s
4. M§]co]m_and_"Cri tenon1
In Chapter I I I ,  we saw that Wittgenstein could not be held to ta lly  
responsible for the notion that a criterion is a decisive piece of evidence.
I t  was Wittgenstein's opinion that whether or not we choose to appeal to
}.
a criterion or c r ite r ia  w ill  depend on the question being asked of-us.
*■ With certain kinds of questions, he intimated, an appeal to c r ite r ia  fa iled
28to play any purposive role at a l l .  „ This is s ignificant when we consider 
how Malcolm uses the word "criterion" in his book, Dreaming.
For Malcolm, a "criterion" is something that settles a question 
29with certainty. He te l ls  us in Chapter I I I ,  "The Criteria  of Sleep"
that the application of a criterion must be able to yield an affirmative  
30or negative-result. Later in his book Malcolm brings this interpreta­
tion of a "criterion" to bear on the concept of dreaming:
One may think to overcome these d i f f ic u lt ie s  by allowing 
that the descriptions that people give of their private  
states .provides a determination of what those states are 
and whether they are the same. But i f  one takes this line 
(which is correct) one canndt then permit a question to 
be raised as to whether those descriptions are in error 
or not--for this would be to fa l l  back into the original 
d if f ic u lty .  One must treat the descriptions as the 
criterion of what the inner occurrences are. "An 'inner 
process' stands in need of outward criteria"'
(Wittgenstein, #580). [D, p. 55.]
Malcolm cites dream-telling as the "sole criterion" of dreaming on the
31 <~authority of Wittgenstein. However, I believe that this in terpretation^
of a "criterion" has its  problems when he applies i t  to the concept of
dreaming.
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We w ill  recall that i t  is not part of Wittgenstein's position
that a concept which has c r ite r ia  is always employed on the basis of
those c r ite r ia :
The concepts of pain, of mental images, and of personal 
identity have .criteria  which Wittgenstein discusses at 
length; but none of these c r i te r ia ,  he says, are applied 
when a man says of himself that he has a pain or an 
image. 32
Why then would anyone insist on waking testimony as the "sole criterion"
33 -■of the concept of dreaming as Malcolm does? I f  a question about whether
someone's had a dream amounts to nothing more than an inquisitive gesture,
why is i t  so important that c r ite r ia  be established with respect to
dreams? Charles Dunlop offers this suggestion:
In the context of Malcolm's rejection of "received 
opinion" this approach is readily understandable.
For i f  behavior were admitted as a criterion of dreaming, 
then sense could be made of the thesis that dreams 
occur in "physical time," and an avenue would open up 
for the "verification" of memory claims and for 
physiological studies concerned with dreaming. 34
Malcolm's reasons for refusing to accept any additional c r ite r ia ,
'besides waking testimony, seem to be:' (1) people would have to be in-
formed when they woke up as to whether they had dreamt or not - instead
of the ir informing us as i t  now is [D, p. 80]; (2) in order to teach
someone "the new concept of dreaming" we would have to explain the
physiological experiment that provides the new criter ion , [£, p. 81].
He concludes that:
Considering the radical conceptual changes that the 
adoption of a physiological criterion would en ta il ,  
i t  is evident that a new concept would have been created 
that only remotely resembled the old one. To use the 
name 'dreaming' for the new concept would spring from
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confusion and result in confusion. All of this 
f  can be avoided by holding firmly to waking 
testimony as the sole criterion of dreaming.- 
_  ' i l ,  P- 81.]
We need to ask: "Would this n/w concept of dreaming spring from and
result in the confusion that*Malcolm suggests?" I do not think so.
Let me explain why..
J
According to Malcolm, the only way .to prevent conceptual con­
fusion is to hold fast to waking testimony as the sole criterion of
35dreaming. Yet i t  is not-clear that our concept of dreaming is derived
0*
solely from descriptions of dreams. To give waking testimony the only
i  '
place on the stage highlights the dream narrative at the expense of the 
phenomenon, i .e .  the te ll ing  of the dream at the expense of the phenomenon 
itself--having the dream. 1 would argue that to turn a blind eye to
i , 7
the-phenomenon' is to neglect an essential part'of what i t  .means to have* 
the concept "dream." REM studies and laboratory experiments, have been 
very influential in the investigation of dreams in the past twenty years. 
^We would do well to ask: "Do we think of these experiments as misguided
I
efforts? Do we think that these individuals interested in investigating 
the phenomenon of dreaming are confused? Are we puzzled by their dis- *• 
coveries in such a way that we are no longer able to determine i f  we
9
had a dream when we wake up?" Not a l l  a l l .  We-still awaken and te l l  our 
dreams in the same way we always have. I t  is not the case that the con­
cept of dreaming has been altered in the radical way Malcolm suggests i t  
would.
i
^This being so, i t  is evident that Malcolm's application of a c r i-  
terion is in some degree of tension with recent advances in science.
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Since i t  is possible that our concept o f dreaming can accommodate addi­
tional c r i te r ia  without radical concept change, Malcolm has been unduly 
r e s t r ic t iv e  in c i t in g  dream-telling as the sole c r i te r io n  o f dreaming.
In th is  respect his in te rp re ta t ion  of Wittgenstein 's notion o f  "c r i te r io n "  
(as a decisive piece o f evidence) has i t s  problems. I would question 
whether Wittgenstein would have claimed that our concept o f dreaming is  
derived sole ly  from descriptions o f dreams. I t  seems to me that in l ig h t  
of his remarks on pain and mental imagery, Wittgenstein would have placed 
dreaming in the category of an "inner process." Therfore, the ju s t i f i c a ­
tion' fo r  an appeal to any c r i te r io n  with respect to dreams would s t i l l  
remain questionable.
At #307 o f the PJ_, Wittgenstein asks:
"Are you not re a lly  a behaviourist in disguise?
Aren 't you at bottom re a l ly  saying that everything ' ‘
except human behaviour is a f ic t io n ? "  - I f  I do 
speak of a f ic t io n ,  then i t  is  of a grammatical 
f i c t io n .  [PI_, #307.]
■- When Wittgenstein speaks o f  a "grammatical f ic t io n "  a t #307, what
he appears to be saying is  that the unrea lity  or f ic t iv e  nature o f  an
"inner process" is deeply embedded in language. Wittgenstein does not
claim that an "inner process" is a f ic t io n  in the sense tha t i t  does
not e x is t .  \ Rafher tha t when we s ta r t  to ta lk  about processess such as
"th ink ing ,"  "sensing," "dreaming," and attempt to discover th e ir  essence,
our e f fo r ts  are stymied by our forms o f expression, our ways o f speaking.
*
This is not to' say. that an "inner process" is  a meaningless notion, but 
that our ways o f speaking hold us at-bay and prevent us from dealing with 
these f ic t io n s  in  a p ro f i tab le  way.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I t  should be noted that from a Wittgensteinian point of view 
there may be some problems vfith attempts on the part of scientists to 
establish objective c r ite r ia  for dreaming. In the twenty years since 
the publication of Malcolm's Dreaming, sciences such as psychology and 
neurophysiology have taken a strong interest in the investigation of 
^  objective c r ite r ia  with respect to dreams. While i t  is clear that the 
intentions of these scientists and psychologists d iffe r  from t()ose of " 
the philosopher at times these men of science commit themselves to an
interpretation of dreaming that smacks of the "conceptual confusion"-
Malcolm predicts. Witness this quote taken from a recent/iews a r t ic le  
g t In a more pure sc ien tif ic  vein, Dr. LaBerge is using
the uniqtle^ommunication a b i l i t ie s  of lucid dreamers— 
he calls them oneironauts or "dream sailors" - to
measure dream states from the inside. Indicating with
eye movements when they begin and stop, the oneironauts1 
coded blinks have shown i t  takes just as long for them 
to count from one to 10 or sing a song while dreaming 
as when awake. Other studies indicate that the counting 
sparks le f t  brain activ ity  and the singing the right 
brain a c t iv i ty j / ju s t  as i t  would do when we are awake..
"All this shows that for.certain activ ities  at least 
when we dream we are doing them, we are really doing 
them. They are not just imaginings," says Dr. LaBerge.
'  ^ Although this text is somewhat lacking in substantive detail i t  » 
appears that the statements offered by this journalist (via LaBerge) 
contain a hint of conceptual confusion. I f  La Berge means to suggest that 
a sleeping subject can consciously "indicate" when he intends to begin 
singing a songr or counting to ten, we are le f t  with a rather bizzare
picture of dreaming. I t  takes l i t t l e  reflection to see that there is
- ‘ something odd (conceptually confused) about saying that the blink of an
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eye is evidence that people do have thoughts, images and sensations 
while asleep. Why then do I conti/nue to maintain that Malcolm's posi­
tion is too restrictive?
In the previous section wp-noticed that there were severe 
d iff icu lt ies  with Malcolm's interpretation of "criterion" as something 
which settles a question w ith \certa in ty ., As a final consideration, I 
wish to examine and c r i t ic a l ly  evaluate Malcolm's application of Wittgenstein' 
remark that "An 'TTinef"process' stands in need of outward criter ia"
[P I , #580.] Wittgenstein offered this remark in connection with what 
I w ill  call his "other minds" argument. Consider this example as an 
i l lus tra tion : Suppose my friend is standing beside me and thinking that
I am poorly dressed. What i f  he says to himself, "Kevin is poorly dressed?" 
Clearly, I have no way of knowing what my friend is thinking unless-he 
manifests his thought in some kind of behavior. I f  my friend were to 
say, "You should have'worn dress pants" and his statement were accompanied 
by a grimace I would have something substantial to go on.. However, just  
the thought without outward expression is not enough. Wittgenstein is 
saying that we cannot ta lk  about this "inner process" in someone else, at 
least in, any kind of meaningful way.
The essence of Malcolm's argument is th is: "Dreaming cannot be
of thoughts, images, sensations because i t  is theoretically
1 38to verify that a person had them while asleep." He is
hesitant to approve of any advances made by scientists cind psychologists
with respect to the possibility of establishing^objective c r ite r ia  for
dreaming for the reason that these c r ite r ia  would involve the stipulation
the having' 
impossible'
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of new convention and ultimately conceptual confusion. When confronted 
with sc ien tif ic  evidence, say a number of blips and squiggles on a gnaph 
sheets Malcolm might say, "All well and good for science. But these are
not images, thoughts, sensations and judgments. Here you have only
altered the concept of dreaming."
At best Malcolm seems to take any scien tif ic  evidence for dream- 
ing to be only an approximation. The hard evidence s t i l l  remains' to be 
had. What would satisfy Malcolm? What would i t  take to convince him 
that we rea lly ’ do have mental phenomena when we sleep? Here we must be 
careful. In order to substantiate the position that people do have mental 
phenomena during sleep you would have verify that someone was having 
images, thoughts, sensations while the person was asleep. This would 
involve:
(1) Observing the images, thoughts in each case;
(2) Establishing that the subject was aware of having them
(perhaps he could communicate them to you).
I t  is obvious both of these avenues are impossible. The f i r s t  implies 
you could tap in on a mental process and observe i t  l ike  a picture show. 
The second suggests a person could communicate with you and be dreaming 
at the same time. This is a strange picture of the phenomenon of dream­
ing, to be sure.
There is a Conceptual absurdity lurking at the heart of the veri­
f ication procedure mentioned above. The problem with an attempt to 
observe and establish that sleeping subjects do have mental phenomena 
during sleep seems to involve a physical impossibility rather than a
*
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theoretical one. In this respect, Malcolm's contention that dreams 
are not composed of, or identical with thoughts, images etc. appears 
to be supported by a s tr ic t  verificationism. Yet i t  is not clear that 
there need by any pressing reason to pursue an attempt to verify mental
which could be verified on demand? Of course not. This sort of "thought," 
"image," "sensation" talk seems to be absent from the statements which 
comprise our dream narratives.
The fact is that there has never been a tradition of verification  
associated with dreaming. Although i t  is most appropriate to speak of 
a verification problem with respect to dreams, i t  is d i f f ic u l t  to see 
why Malcolm attempts to bring this problem to bear on philosophical ques­
tions associated with dreaming. When I prefix a story with "I dreamt" 
^people's ears prick up. They are interested in what I say, but that is 
as far  as i t  goes. For this reason, i t  seems unusual that Malcolm, a 
philosopher who claims the concept of dreaming is derived from descrip­
tions of dreams, pushes for a tradition of ver if ica t ion  in the f i r s t
On Malcolm's account, i f  someone woke up and suggested they enjoyed 
thoughts, images, sensations (Malcolm does not specify whether the person 
is merely claiming that these activ it ies  occurred in a dream) he would 
argue that testimony is not indicative of having had those mental'
sistence on a v e r i f ia b i l i ty  principle is enough to support the notion
phenomena in a sleeping subject. When we are inv<ftved i el 1ing a 
dream, are we claiming to have experienced a series of thoughts, images,
place.
phenomena while asleep. Yet i t  does not seem clear that Malcolm's in-
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that the existence and occurrence is legitimate in one respect, while
meaningless and unfounded in the other. I f  he refuses to credit waking
testimony as a criterion in this case, i t  is obvious that he has restricted
his consideration of c r ite r ia  to the kind of things his argument is 
/
specifically designed to exclude.
i
Malcolm seems to be saying that i f  you cannot express the thoughts, 
images, sensations you claim to have while asleep then dreaming is not 
having those thoughts, images etc. I f  you claim that you thought, judged, 
had images or feelings while asleep, Malcolm would say you are mistaken. 
What I think Malcolm neglects to emphasize enough is that the language 
we use to te l l  dreams is a descriptive language. Granted, there are 
utterances in our language that lack referents (Ah-Choo!, Ugh!). But 
the language we use in te lling a. dream is not made up of these expressions. 
The language that we use to te l l  our dreams has the same vocabulary as 
the language we use to refer to thoughts, sensations, and feelings that 
we have while awake. In this respect, we are put o ff balance when we 
hear Malcolm argue that dreams and dreaming are not a ll these things we 
have supposed them to be. What we should noticeyfs"that Malcolm has 
altered the intention of Wittgenstein's statement "An ' inner process’ 
stands in need of outward c r ite r ia ."  Malcolm has made a qualitative  
judgement about dreaming on the basis of v e r i f ia b i l i ty .  I t  seems that 
i f  we cannot establish that certain things- occur, (thoughts, images, 
judgements, sensations), then dreaming cannot be those kinds of things.
I am unsure i f  Wittgenstein would have approved of this move.
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Wittgenstein did not intend to argue that we could not speak 
meaningfully about our own mental processes. 'Further, i t  is not clear 
that he wanted his statement about an 'inner process' standing in need 
of outward c r ite r ia  to be used as a tool to make distinctions about
what dreaming may or may ngt be. Wittgenstein was only making us aware
* ' &  
of the d if f ic u lt ies  involved in speaking about these processes in other ^  •
people. This is not to say that we cannot speak about, or have opinions
about, our own.
When a person is asked, "Did you dream last night?" i t  is a rare 
occurrence to find him answering "Yes" and then at a loss to say anything 
else. The language-game of te l l in g  dreams is descriptive, and our dreams 
are often described quite v iv id ly . This seems to substantiate the 
opinion held by other philosophers, i .e .  that dreams are composed of 
mental phenomena rather thari support the position that they are not. I t  
is clear then that my disagreement with Malcolm's use of Wittgenstein's 
remark at #580 of the Investigations is ju s tif ied .
Summary
A book such as Malcolm’s Dreaming throws our cognitive wheels 
into motion. We say, "Here’ s a fellow that denies that, dreams are composed 
of, and identical with any kind of mental phenomenon occurring during 
sleep." We begin to form our own opinions about what dreaming "is"— 
after a while we think that somehow Malcolm has to be wrong. By denying 
that dreams are identical with, or composed of thoughts, images, he leaves 
us with l i t t l e  choice other than to say that they are^ or come up with a
i
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better explanation of what dreaming is (a definition of ^he word "dream")- 
Yet, i f  we choose to meet Malcolm in this way we assume that there is one 
r ig h t  answer to be had here. I maintain that this is  where we as 
philosophers lose track of our bearings in language, the conventions that 
surround dream-tel l ing, and join Malcolm in the philosophical f ly -b o tt le .
In denying that dreams are identical with, or composed of mental 
phenomena Malcolm dangles an epistemological carrot in front of us. The 
d if f ic u lty  is to avoid attempting to meet this question by searching for 
the essence of dreaming. I f  we attempt to prove that dreams really are 
thoughts, images and sensations this is where we, as philosophers get into 
trouble. What kind of attitude do I have toward the phenomenon itse lf?
Do I want to say that I do have thoughts and images while asleep... in 
the same sense that I had them while awake? Do I know what these experi­
ences called "dreams" really  are? I f  I do, would I want to call them a 
series of thoughts and impressions? These are most unusual questions; 
but some of the questions that a book such as Malcolm's Dreaming draw 
to the surface. I have argued, though, that these are questions which 
people engaged in speakjng the language and te l l in g  the ir  dreams are not 
fam iliar with. And'because these questions fa i l  to find a place in the 
conventions that^surround the phenomenon of dreaming, they are questions 
that philosophers, are neither ju s tif ied , nor required to answer.
We have noticed that in charging Descartes, Kant and other 
scholars with the mistaken claim - that we think, reason etc. in the 
same sense while asleep as we do when awake, Malcolm overlooks the 
"dream-distinction" articulated iruthe previous chapter. As well, he
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commits a serious mistake in argumentation by supposing that philosophers, 
psychologists and the cotimon man have ignored i t  as well. I t  is for  
these and other reasons which I have mentioned that Malcolm's Dreaming 
and "Dreaming and Scepticism" provide philosophy with an unsatisfactory 
attitude toward dreams and an unrealistic interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
contribution to philosophical problems.
This thesis has attempted to meet the sceptical question "Am I 
awake or asleep and dreaming?" by contesting its  grammar in ligh t of 
the use of the word "dream." I began this discussion by saying that i f .  
we could make any headway i t  would be gained attempting to refute the 
sceptic by charging him with a grammatical error, that of unjustly ex­
tending the usgjo f^ the word "dream" beyond the limits of ordinary 
language. Most people, in speaking a language experience no d if f ic u lty  
distinguishing the use of the word "awake" £^r6m the words "asleep" and 
"dreaming." The fact that we know how to use these words in a number of 
ways suggests that we have no problem distinguishing waking l i f e  from 
dreams. The sceptic, however, in juxtaposing the words "awake" and 
"asleep and dreaming" mars our credulity and confidence in language.
What is normally considered a natural but significant distinction in 
l inguistic  usage now becomes a metaphysical puzzle.
By using the.words "awake" and "asleep and dreaming" side by 
side to stress s im ilarit ies  in grammar•rather than differences the sceptic 
throws us fhto a quagmire. Yet, i f  we cease our metaphysical inquiry 
for a moment we are struck by the grammar of this question. We discover 
that we are not used to using these words or hearing them used in just
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this way. For this reason I have argued that a grammatical investigation 
of the sceptical question "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" provides 
the most plausible alternative as a way of- tackling this question that 
philosophy can pursue.
Looking back at the history of attempts to deal with the sceptical 
question, we notice that Malcolm's thorough treatment of this problem 
deserves much credit. This is because he is one of the f i r s t  contemporary 
philosophers to make a strong criticism of the legitimacy of the sceptic's 
question. Yet'by attempting to refute the sceptic on the basis that 
sleep has no experiential content, Malcolm tries to tackle a fundamentally 
philosophical problem in a most unusual way. According to Malcolm the 
"illegitimacy" of the sceptic's question rests in the fact that i t  is 
impossible to make judgments, have thoughts, expedience sensations while 
asleep. The unfortunate thing about Malcolm's charge of "illegitimacy" 
is that i f  one s t i l l  favors the opinion that sleeping subjects do have 
mental phenomena during sleep his refutation of scepticism goes by the 
board.
In sum, Malcolm deserves recognition for contesting the sceptical 
question associated with dreaming. S t i l l ,  to attempt to refute scepticism 
on the grounds that sleep has no experiential content seems to commit 
Malcolm to a rather limited and unimaginative view. In order to refute 
Malcolm you would have to show that people do have thoughts, images and 
sensations while asleep. I maintain that this is something that 
philosophers are clearly not able to pursue with any hope of success.
In this case i t  would seem that we must leave the last word to science.
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And because science has suggested, with some justif ica tion  that people 
do have mental activ ity  during sleep Malcolm has clearly stretched the 
limits of philosophy a l i t t l e  too far in attempting to meet the sceptic's 
challenge.
?
4.
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rFOOTNOTES
Chapter V y r
1^ have decided to refer to the questfoji"Ain I awake or asleep 
and dreaming?" as a traditional philosophical proB^am associated with 
dreaming; the question "Are dreams composed o f ,. or identical with any 
kind of mental phenomenon occurring during sleep?" as a contemporary 
problem associated with dreaming.
2Descartes, Leibniz, Ayer, see Chapter I ,  pp. 7-10.
3
Nelson, Pearl, see Chapter I ,  pp. 8-9.
> 4Here the reader is directed toward Peter Unger's Ignorance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 1, where he states:
"The type of scepticism for which T^argue is perhaps the most trad i­
tional one: scepticism about knowledge. This is the thesis that no
one ever knows anything about anything."
5The argument which I pro.vide here bears some similarity to the 
position advanced by Malcolm in D and D & S, i . e .  that the sentence .
"I am asleep" fa ils  to express a possibility because i t  is an inherently 
absurd form of words (a logical impossibility, see D;, p. 109). However, 
Malcolm's analysis qf the sceptic's question finds support in his opinion 
that sleep has no experiential content, a position which I continue t o ’ 
take exception with. Therefore, rather than attempt to subscribe to 
Malcolm's position I have chosen to res tr ic t  my argument to an analysis 
that reveals that the sentence "I may be asleep and dreaming" fa ils  
to express a meaningful possibility for a waking subject.
g
My debt to Descartes is obvious here.
^This example was suggested during a discussion of the sceptical 
problem with Dr. Pinto and Branko Bilcar. I t  is not clear that e ither  
of these two individuals subscribe to a firm sceptical position with 
respect to dreaming. Therefore, this example which they have cited may 
be subject to the same criticism which they have put forward against my 
position.
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I l l
s
o
Stanley Cavell, "The Availab ility  of Wittgenstein's Later 
Philosophy," ed. George Pitcher, Wittgenstein: The Philosophical
Investiqations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968),
p p ^ 0 - 1 7 1 .
g'~
The"teasic sense of the word "dream" in which a person cannot 
dream unless he^s asleep
10Malcolib, D, p. 39.
^See D/ pp. 28, 29, 62, 100.
^Malcolm, D & S, p. 100.
^Malcolm, D ., pp. 49-50.
^Malcolm; D & S, p. 116.
15Ib id . , p. 105.
16Malcolm, D, p. 59. ‘
17Ib id . , p. 58.
18Ib id . , p. 59.
19See A.J. Ayer, "Professor Malcolm on Dreams," and D.C. Dennett 
"Are Dreams Experiences?" in Philosophical Essays on Dreaming ed. Dunlop 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). -
28See Chapter IV, pp. 51-55.
^Malcolm, D ., p. 51.
22Malcolm, D & S, p. 114.
23In this respect see pp. 2, 3, 41, 61, 98, 110, 112, in J], and 
pp. 104, 105, 118, 122, 123, in D & S.
24Descartes, M, p. 77.
25Malcolm, D & S, pp. 105-106.
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26Ib id . ,  p. 114. 
v27Ib id . , p. 110.
28See pp. 29-31, Chapter/III.
> Malcolm, ]), p. 60.
3° Ib jd . ,  p. 24.
31 Ib id . ,  p. 55. *
32Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd e d . , s.v. "Criterion," by 
Anthony Kenny.
33Ib id . , p. 81.
34Charles E.M. Dunlop, Philosophical Essays on Dreaming, 
ed. Dunlop (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 3lT
35Malcolm, JD, p. 81. .
1 /^239, 290, 377, 404.' 36See PI
37Toronto (Ontario) The Globe and M ail, 18 June 1982. 
38Malcolm, JD, p. 51.
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POSTSCRIPT
Why shouldn't I apply words in ways that conflic t with 
their original usage? "Doesn't Freud, for example, do 
this when he calls even an anxiety dream a wish­
ful filment dream? Where is the difference? In a 
scientific  perspective a new use is ju s tif ied  by a 
theory. And i f  this theory is false, the new extended 
use has to be given up. But in philosophy the extended 
use does not rest on true or false beliefs about natural 
processes. No fact ju s t if ies  i t .  None can-give i t  
any support.
4
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value^
In the previous chapter I argued that the sceptic has extended 
the use of the word "dream" and that the use of the word "dream" in his 
question is both illeg itim ate  and unjustified. The purpose of this 
exercise has been to sliow that because, the sceptic's question is subject 
tot these grammatical considerations and confusions i t  should not be treated 
as a. meaningful philosophic inquiry. Let me conclude by offering a b r ie f r< 
restatement of the position I have put forward in this paper.
I t  is d i f f ic u l t  to imagine circumstances that would give rise  
to a question such as "Am I awake or asleep and dreaming?" Speaking with 
sincerity I can say. that up until the time Ibecame seriously interested 
in philosophical problems I had never asked myself this question, except 
perhaps in jes t.  As.a human being, l ike any other, I need sleep to 
survive. On countless occasions my sleep has been invaded by dreams-- 
these dreams have been sometimes v iv id , sometimes puzzling. , Hpwever,
I have never had any d if f ic u lty  separating my dreams from waking l i f e .
113
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I have always thought that others could too; at least until I read Descartes.
I believe that a great many philosophical hours have been i l l -  
spent attempting to devise tests and proofs to decide whether we are 
awake or asleep and dreaming. Why should we continue trying to provide 
an explanation? To be sure, we may continue to encounter strange shifts  
of scene that throw us into momentary confusion—but these expressions 
of surprise ("Am I dreaming" "I must be dreaming") are not indicative of 
someone seriously doubting whether he is awake or asleep and dreaming.
I f  there is nothing out of jo in t  with our world there is no reason to 
llhink that we are asleep and dreaming. To think that you are dreaming
t
is as much as saying "All is il lus ion."  Can we live under this thought, 
for very long? I do not see how we could. I t  is a frightening picture.
I t  leaves me helpless—tonv away from my regular seat at the control 
panel.
In an e ffo rt  to resolve this disturbing feature of the sceptic's
question various phi 1 c iphers have attempted to provide what they feel
to be a conclusive refutation of the sceptical position associated with
dreaming. The arguments put forward in Norman Malcolm's Dreaming and
"Dreaming and Sc^ticism" are, in a large part, formulated with the
intention of refuting the sceptic's position. However, in order for
Malcolm's refutation to succeed one must subscribe to the position that
sleep has no experiential content; a'position that seems unduly restric tive
2
and subject to additional objections.
This paper has gone to some length to argue that a question as 
to whether one is awake or asleep and dreaming is not debated or hashed
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over in ordinary language. I t  has a limited group that subscribe to i t  
wi-th 'any interest and this group w ill  probably be found seated in a 
philosophy classroom. I f  i t  were the case that I genuinely thought I 
was dreaming, or remained in doubt about i t  I would not be able to move 
a'muscle in language or l i f e .  I t . i s  for this reason that I have argued 
from a Wittgensteinian perspective, to suggest that a grammatical 
investigation of a traditional .and contemporary problem associated with 
dreaming are perhaps the best way of tackling these questions that we, 
as philosophers can pursue.
* * ,f
!
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FOOTNOTES
Postscript
\udwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, (Chicago: Universi.ty
of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 44.
A2
In this respect see n\y argument which is developed in the 
section entitled "A Critque of Malcolm", Chapter V. Here I offer a 
number of objections against Malcolm's position as advanced in D and 
D & S.
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